<p><span>In anticipation of Poland’s submission of its updated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP/KPEiK) to the European Commission in June 2024, </span><strong>Carbon-Free Europe (CFE)</strong><span> commissioned Evolved Energy Research, in collaboration with the Silesian University of Technology (SUT), the Institute of Power Engineering - National Research Institute, and Princeton University’s Andlinger Center, to conduct an </span><strong>extensive energy systems modelling study</strong><span>. The objective of the two-phase project is to </span><strong>delineate pathways for Poland to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050</strong><span>, thereby informing not only the NECP revision but also future policies, national strategies, and long-term investments.</span></p>
<p><span>The </span><strong>two-phase Net-Zero Poland (NZP) study</strong><span> provides a first-of-its-kind, detailed and transparent articulation of alternative pathways for Poland to transition to net-zero emissions by 2050. The study aims to inform energy-transition strategy, policy formulation, and investment decision making in both the public and private sectors. Below you can find the results of the</span><strong> first phase </strong><span>of the project, which was </span><strong>led by CFE</strong><span> and provides critical and data-based insights on a national and international level. The </span><strong>second phase, led by SUT</strong><span>, will use the data to run a higher spatial resolution model that enables key land-use, socio-technical, environmental, and investment challenges to be discussed at the voivodeship, powiat, and gminas level.</span></p>
<p><span>Poland’s energy landscape remains </span><strong>more heavily reliant on fossil fuels</strong><span> compared to other EU Member States. Because of this, Poland faces unique challenges to meet the EU’s ambitious emissions reduction targets under the Fit for 55 package, while ensuring coal regions are not left behind and energy prices remain affordable. The </span><a href="https://commission.europa.eu/publications/poland-draft-updated-necp-2021-2030_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>NECP draft update</span></a><span> sets </span><strong>ambitious targets for Poland</strong><span>, aiming for a 29.8% share of renewable energy sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption by 2030 (compared to 9.4% in 2022).</span><span><sup>1</sup></span></p>
<p><span>With a well-designed implementation strategy, Poland can achieve a just transition, zero-emission energy system, and improved air quality as outlined in the proposed </span><a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/climate/energy-policy-of-poland-until-2040-epp2040" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 (PEP2040)</span></a><span>. This strategy relies on a </span><strong>diverse energy mix to be successful</strong><span>, including accelerating renewable deployment alongside nuclear energy. </span></p>
<p><span>Our analysis explored </span><strong>eight different pathways for Poland to reach net-zero</strong><span>, each of which has different cost implications and feasibility risks. In this report, we </span><strong>highlight results in six key areas</strong><span>: 1) achieving clean heat, 2) future of coal with carbon capture and storage, 3) role of nuclear energy, 4) renewable resource availability, 5) essential hydrogen interconnector, and 6) electric vehicles.</span></p>
<p><span>The full technical report can be found <a href="https://assets.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2iDzvF9Di2nVrTywjEAdER/dbdcc3fbbd738d4abd902d190f4f1507/Poland_NECP_Analysis.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>. A full data Tableau with interactive results can be found at the end of this publication.</span></p>
<h2><span>Achieving Clean Heat</span></h2>
<p><span>Achieving a clean and decarbonised heating system for Poland requires two main strategies 1) replacing in-home coal and biomass boilers with heat pumps and 2) decarbonising steam supply for district heating and industry. Today, around 60% of residential buildings rely on coal or biomass boilers, 35% on district heating systems, and 5% on heat pumps. In our Core pathway, the percentage of homes with heat pumps needs to jump to 17% by 2030 and 45% by 2050. These heat pumps replace in-home coal and biomass boilers while district heating systems are preserved and decarbonised upstream. To achieve this goal, Poland requires a supply chain to install heat pumps in over 200,000 homes per year and more than quadruple electricity supply by 2050. </span></p>
<p><span>Below you can see how steam for district heating, as well as industry, is decarbonised. Currently, steam is principally produced through coal power plants and boilers. The coal phaseout for steam production is achieved primarily through the deployment of large heat pumps, with some gasification in the short-term. Beyond 2030, nuclear facilities also play an important role in providing steam, providing up to 14% of supply.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 1:</strong> Steam production across all modelled pathways.</span></h4>
<div class="mceNonEditable">
<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/SteamSupply_NZP/STEAMSUPPLY?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:redirect=auth&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
</div>
<div class="mceNonEditable"><img class="tableau-fallback-image"></div>
<h2><span>Future of Coal with Carbon Capture and Storage</span></h2>
<p><span>Our pathway “High Coal w/ CCS” models what would happen if Poland were to keep coal in its energy economy system with up to 15 GW of coal capacity by 2050, equal to about 50% of the current fleet. We ran this pathway not to recommend preserving coal capacity, but to demonstrate the trade-offs in a strategy banking on carbon capture technology with coal or hoping to delay renewable deployment for future technology breakthroughs. As you can see in Figure 2, keeping coal creates a lower need for gas power compared to the Core pathway, but it does not negate the need for nuclear and renewables.</span></p>
<h4>
<strong>Figure 2: </strong><span>Electricity capacity in the “Core” versus the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway</span>
</h4>
<div class="mceNonEditable">
<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/ElectricCapacity_NZP/ELECTRICCAPACITY?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
</div>
<p><span>There are two potentially insurmountable challenges with the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway: 1) costs and 2) carbon capture transport and storage infrastructure needs. A future bound to coal is the highest cost pathway and extremely expensive toward 2050 with at least 8.0 billion EUR more investments compared to our "Core" Pathway in the year of 2050 alone. It also requires over 100 megatons (Mt) of CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> exports annually on top of an annual 20 Mt domestic CO<sub>2</sub></span><span> sequestration and some domestic CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> utilisation (</span><strong>Figure 3</strong><span>). Achieving these scales of operations for both sequestration and export requires careful planning. Expanding CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> pipelines to Germany and other Central European countries as well as the Nordics is required in all pathways, but needs to be scaled up significantly in the case of keeping coal within the energy system.</span></p>
<p><span>Irrespective of the economics of CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> pipelines and deployment of carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) technology, Poland will need to adhere to the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive (</span><a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive-targets-and-rules/renewable-energy-directive_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>RED III</span></a><span>) and account for ageing coal infrastructure that will need replacement regardless of climate targets.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 3:</strong> Carbon capture sequestration in Poland, export, and utilisation.</span></h4>
<div class="mceNonEditable">
<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/CarbonManagement_NZP/CARBONMANAGEMENT?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
</div>
<h2><span>Role of Nuclear Energy</span></h2>
<p><span>In all our model pathways nuclear energy plays a significant role in providing zero carbon electricity for the power sector as well as steam for industrial processes and district heating (see “Achieving Clean Heat”) and hydrogen production (see “Essential Hydrogen Interconnector”). We consider the potential of different sizes and types of reactors, including large light water reactors and advanced small modular reactors. </span></p>
<p><span>In the power sector, nuclear energy provides 19 GW of electric capacity by 2050 in our “Core” pathway. With less nuclear deployment due to cost constraints, represented with our “High Nuclear Costs” pathway, Poland would need to deploy more than three times the capacity of alternative clean energy resources. Figure 4 shows that replacing 19 GW of nuclear energy requires building more than 70 GW of alternative resources including majority solar, offshore wind, gas, and storage. The total electric capacity needs to be higher to provide the same electricity generation, including an increased gas peaker capacity and more electric storage to balance the grid. </span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 4:</strong> Change in electricity capacity for the “High Nuclear Costs” pathways compared to “Core”</span></h4>
<div class="mceNonEditable">
<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/ElectricCapacityDiff_NZP/ELECTRICCAPACITYDIFFERENCE?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="1051" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
</div>
<p><span>Offshore wind power becomes especially important in any pathway with limited nuclear energy deployment as solar and onshore wind power are using almost all available resources (see Figure 6). As you can see in Figure 5, the technologies have an inverse deployment relationship. High nuclear cost increases offshore wind demand and vice versa as shown by the “High Offshore Wind Costs” pathway. Considering cost and subsequent deployment uncertainties, a flexible framework that incentivizes the buildout of both nuclear and offshore wind is necessary.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 5:</strong> Electricity generation across all modelled scenarios.</span></h4>
<div class="mceNonEditable">
<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/ElectricityGeneration_NZP/ELECTRICITYGENERATION?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
</div>
<h2><span>Renewable Resource Availability</span></h2>
<p><span>The EU requires Poland to reach 42.5% renewables in final energy consumption by 2030, a target that Poland can reach considering wind and solar resource potential. In our analysis, we consider the potential of renewable resources based on land use availability, resource quality, and relative economics compared to other clean energy resources. Reaching this target for final energy consumption will require Poland to ramp up its current power sector target of 50% renewables by 2030 and the electrification of the transportation sector (see “Electric Vehicles”). Our pathways suggest Poland should achieve 60-66% renewables in the power sector by 2030 even while total electricity generation increases by 50% compared to 2022.</span></p>
<p><span>Below you can see the Wind and Solar Resource Potential for Poland (orange) and how much of the renewable resources are used in each pathway over time (blue) to meet the renewable energy share. Onshore wind is a valuable resource that is maxed out in all pathways by 2040, except in a pathway where we explicitly prevent additional onshore wind builds. The vast majority of fixed offshore wind resources are used up over time as well and most pathways are also tapping into more expensive floating offshore wind resources. If nuclear power is prevented due to high cost or if onshore wind cannot be deployed, both fixed and floating offshore wind resources are facing maximum use. Solar is deployed across all pathways and large-scale deployment is maxed out if nuclear deployment is limited.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 6:</strong> Wind and solar resource potential.</span></h4>
<div class="mceNonEditable">
<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/ResourceUse_NZP/RESOURCEUSE?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
</div>
<h2><span>Essential Hydrogen Interconnector</span></h2>
<p><span>Poland is currently the third largest hydrogen producer (1.3 Mt H</span><span>2</span><span>/year<sup>2</sup></span><span>) and consumer (0.8 Mt H</span><span>2</span><span>/year<sup>3</sup></span><span>) in Europe and fifth largest producer in the world. Building on this workforce and experience, Poland can establish a clean hydrogen industry that fulfils domestic hydrogen demand (a key priority for energy security) and interconnects and exports hydrogen from the Baltics to Germany and other nations in need. </span></p>
<p><span>Figure 7 shows Poland’s domestic hydrogen production. Across all pathways, Poland can leverage its hydrogen experience, future nuclear and offshore power, and biomass resources to become a large-scale hydrogen producer. The “High Biomass” pathway sees the most hydrogen product due to expanded BECCS hydrogen and nuclear heat electrolysis potential.</span></p>
<p><span>Poland’s strategic location makes it an essential hydrogen interconnector for pipelines between the Baltics and Germany and other Central European countries. As shown in Figure 7, Poland can take hydrogen from the Baltics and domestic production, use it as a feedstock to produce e-fuels and ammonia, and export these alternative fuels. Fostering collaboration and strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries will create a cohesive regional hydrogen and alternative fuel network, leveraging an economic opportunity for Poland as a hydrogen interconnector.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 7: </strong>Hydrogen supply and demand</span></h4>
<div class="mceNonEditable">
<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/HydrogenDemand_NZP/HYDROGENDEMAND?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:redirect=auth&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
</div>
<h2><span>Electric Vehicles</span></h2>
<p><span>Early and large-scale electrification, especially of the transportation sector, plays a vital role in the transition to a net-zero emissions economy. The difference between a short-term (“Core” pathway) and long-term electrification (“Slow Consumer Uptake” pathway) in transportation is a much higher price tag during a delayed transportation electrification. </span></p>
<p><span>Below are the additional costs or savings by 2030 or 2050 compared to our Reference pathway that does not achieve net-zero emissions. On the one hand, slow electrification in transportation saves money in the near-term as no or little investments are made into electric vehicle infrastructure. On the other hand, slow electrification ends up costing significantly more money in the long-term because the system has little build-out of cost- and energy-efficient EV infrastructure and requires a higher dependency on expensive zero-emissions liquid fuels to achieve net-zero targets.</span></p>
<p><span>The electric vehicle deployment differences between the Core and Slow Consumer Uptake pathway are significant. In the most economic Core pathway, Poland will have 8.5 million passenger and 660,000 freight EVs by 2030. In the Slow Consumer Uptake pathway, only 1.9 million passenger and 220,000 freight EVs will be in Poland by 2030—a third to a quarter of the capacity of the Core pathway.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 8: </strong>Transportation system costs across scenarios compared to Reference.</span></h4>
<div class="mceNonEditable">
<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/TransportationNetCosts_NZP/TransportNETCOST?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="800" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
</div>
<h4><span>To explore all of our results from NZP see below the full data Tableau.</span></h4>
<div class="mceNonEditable">
<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/Results_NZP/NZP?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="950" height="650" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
</div>
<h3><a href="https://carbonfreeeurope.imgix.net/Polands-Pathways-to-Net-Zero-Emissions.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click here to view the full PDF. </a></h3>

Poland’s Pathways to Net-Zero Emissions

Florian A. Schneider, PhD.

Florian-Schneider

Senior Research Advisor

Lindsey Walter

Co-founder of Carbon-Free Europe

Ben Haley

ben-haley

Co-Founder, Evolved Energy Research

Poland explainer HG

Full Technical Report: Poland NECP Analysis

Memo

<p>Beware of declarations that the recent European parliamentary elections offered a clear verdict on the continent’s politics. It was neither the endorsement of the far-right that many feared nor the validation of the status quo that would make governing easy for the next five years. The European People’s Party (EPP), which leads the current EU governing coalition and is the home of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, remains in power. The agenda enacted over the past five years will remain in place. The results, however, are a cautionary tale. Policymakers and NGOs must quickly adapt to a future that could prove to be even more unstable than today’s economic and political turmoil.</p>
<p>Europe did dodge the bullet of a far-right sweep of the parliamentary elections. Voters across the Nordic countries, in much of Central and Eastern Europe, and on the Iberian peninsula backed mainstream parties. The news, however, was different in Europe’s three most populous and economically powerful countries, Germany, France, and Italy. There, far-right nationalist parties continued their march into the mainstream, offering a much more complex scenario for the future of Europe and the fate of clean energy and climate policy.  </p>
<p>The EU cannot maintain the status quo of how climate policy is formulated and communicated to voters. These policies, and how they are discussed, are alienating large groups of Europeans who feel left behind and disenfranchised. This is being exacerbated by populist extremists on both ideological fringes, particularly on the far-right. The question now is whether governments, political institutions, and NGO communities that have created Europe’s climate and clean energy agenda can adapt quickly enough to reassure Europeans and rebuff the far-right where it remains strong or is growing.</p>
<h4>The Implications for the Next EU Parliament and Legislative Agenda</h4>
<p>The conclusion of the European parliamentary election is only the start of the process of determining the next EU political leadership and ruling majority.  National delegations will now enter into negotiations to form the European political groups—large groupings of cross-national political families. While these negotiations are ongoing, the center-right EPP, which has secured the largest number of seats in parliament, is expected to solidify the ongoing majority coalition with the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D) and classic liberal Renew Europe. The far-right nationalist ID Party, and unaffiliated nationalist parties like Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD), will likely be excluded from the next government, though the European Conservative and Reformists (ECR) group may align with the EPP’s majority position on some issues. This balance of power in the Parliament will also determine the political leadership in other key EU institutions, including the appointment of the next European Commission President.</p>
<p>However the next EU government emerges, we expect the EU Parliament and Commission to follow only a slightly more center-right policy agenda than the current status quo. Current European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who has been in office since 2019, is likely to receive a second term. This means continued implementation of the Green Deal, industrial competitiveness, and the EU climate commitments enacted since 2019 remain in place.</p>
<p>It is, however, an open question as to how much new legislation the next government can enact, especially with a potentially narrower majority. A more empowered set of far-right and nationalist parties could cause more disruption and attempt to slow policymaking down. Even here the far-right’s actions are unpredictable. These parties are fragmented. While most are aligned in opposition to migration and criticism of enacted climate action, they hold conflicting views on how to deal with Russia and China and where they fall regarding Euroscepticism. They could try to undermine Europe’s unity in support of Ukraine and the overall strengthening of the Union, but that path is far from certain. Issues like agriculture, biodiversity, and migration policy could become more tenuous, with coalition partnerships shifting based on the topic. This will lead to more tension, less predictability, and potentially more protracted negotiations over some files.</p>
<h4>National Influence of the European Election</h4>
<p>We should also look at the results of the EU elections from a Member State by Member State perspective. Contrary to many headlines, there was not a far-right wave across the continent. Results can be divided into two camps. The far-right gained or reinforced their support in Europe’s three largest countries, Germany, France, and Italy. It failed to live up to expectations almost everywhere else, notably in Spain, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, and even Hungary.</p>
<p>The biggest takeaway from Germany, France, and Italy is the normalizing of the far-right. The AfD in Germany, the National Rally in France, and the Brothers of Italy all trace their roots to World War II-era fascist parties. Until Brothers of Italy leader Giorgia Meloni became Italian Prime Minister in October 2022, none had ever gained power.  During this election, France’s National Rally outperformed every other party, prompting President Emmanuel Macron to call a snap election for June 20 and July 7. If the National Rally emerges as the strongest party in France in these snap elections, yet another major European economy falls under the influence of the far-right. At the EU level, these three national far-right parties are not fully aligned and have not yet agreed to cooperate, with Meloni and the Brothers of Italy supporting Ukraine and the European Union, while AfD and National Rally are suspiciously pro-Russia.</p>
<p>Across the rest of Europe, there were a variety of national factors that led to the underperformance of the far-right. We shouldn’t read too much into the overall results and try to find pan-European trends. However, it is interesting to note that in several countries—Poland and Hungary in particular—incumbent or recently defeated far-right parties lost ground. This is in keeping with the global anti-incumbent mood among voters.  The combination of the mainstreaming of the far-right and general anti-incumbency sentiment will only make policymaking and navigating European politics more difficult.</p>
<h4>Lessons for Policymaking and Framing</h4>
<p>The broader challenge facing policymakers, political parties, and NGOs is how to interpret these results. There is a danger in viewing it as an endorsement of the past five years’ policies and framing of issues. Persistent voter discontent, a growing anti-incumbent backlash, and the mainstreaming of far-right nationalist parties point to systemic risk. The pace and the volume of legislation cannot continue in the next five years. Nor can it be oriented or framed around issues that many European voters feel are out of touch with, or negatively impact, their daily lives. The new EU leadership, and NGOs that support them, must be explicit about how the Green Deal’s implementation will help improve the lives of everyday Europeans, support industry and agriculture in the EU, and reduce costs.</p>
<p>Reframing the actions the EU has taken over the past five years, justifiably, around improving the continent’s security and competitiveness is an important start to addressing Europeans’ concerns. The next step is to use these policies to enable each Member State to take the actions that will accelerate decarbonization, and address the economic and security issues front and center in their citizens’ minds. If these policies, however, limit or are cast by the populist Right as limiting Europeans’ choices or increasing their costs in the name of “climate action,” the chance of creating an even greater backlash is significant.</p>
<h4>Conclusion</h4>
<p>It is still too early to form firm conclusions on the full impact of the EU elections, and the results were too varied to apply generalizations to the entire Union. Moving forward, members of the climate and energy community must acknowledge that a change of approach is needed in the new mandate to ensure the durability of the net-zero transition. Continuing to engage in technical support for policy implementation and highlighting the need for Transatlantic cooperation on these, ultimately global, issues is important. It is even more critical now to acknowledge and address voter discontent, which is also being exploited by the far-right. There is an opportunity here to build on some of the synergies across US and EU audiences to engage citizens who feel uneasy with the changes occurring, or more insecure because of the cost of living and security crises, and incorporate their concerns in building a broader vision for climate action that is centered around competitiveness, energy security, transatlantic cooperation, and democracy.</p>

EU Election: Short-Term Relief, but Long-Term Threat from the Far Right

Josh 2

Josh Freed

josh-freed

Kelsey Paulding

Kelsey Paulding Horizontal

EU Government Affairs Director

shutterstock 1404881273

Net-Zero Unveiled: UK's Ambitions Analysed

Tone Langengen

Senior Policy Advisor, Climate & Energy Policy at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

Vision

Mission

Support

Latest on LinkedIn

Featured

Poland’s Pathways to Net-Zero Emissions

EU Election: Short-Term Relief, but Long-Term Threat from the Far Right

Net-Zero Unveiled: UK's Ambitions Analysed

Meet Our Team