As energy security becomes the new battleground for global influence, the US and EU must decide—will they lead together or fall behind? 
At the World Economic Forum in January 2025, Ursula Von Der Leyen <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_285">highlighted</a> the European Union’s (EU) plans to strengthen its international cooperation in response to “rising global competition.” Von Der Leyen singled out the United States (US): “No other economies in the world are as integrated as we are.” As energy security has become the driver of many Western democracies, as shown by President Trump’s immediate announcement of a <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/declaring-a-national-energy-emergency/">National Energy Emergency</a>, cooperation and competitiveness are now key to advancing clean energy and industrial policies. This reality is exacerbated by a shifting geopolitical landscape, threatened by a potential dependence on and direct competition with strategic adversaries such as Russia and China. As fossil fuel dependence is a geopolitical risk, decarbonisation should be seen as a strategic opportunity for energy security. Decarbonisation strengthens energy independence and resilience, making the US and EU less vulnerable to external pressures. As such, transatlantic allies must strengthen their collaboration on clean energy development to ensure long-term energy security and affordability while strengthening their competitive edge and economic growth.
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<h2>Key Takeaways:</h2>
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Transatlantic cooperation is essential for clean energy security and economic resilience for both the US and the EU amid rising global competition.
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Tariffs and trade tensions risk undermining US-EU collaboration, benefiting geopolitical competitors.
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Decarbonisation is a strategic advantage—aligning policies can enhance competitiveness while reducing reliance on hostile nations.
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Joint investment and regulatory alignment in clean energy can secure supply chains, drive innovation, and create jobs.
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A coordinated EU-US approach will strengthen industrial leadership and ensure long-term energy security for both.
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<h2>Facing the Challenge: US and EU Leadership Amid Rising Global Tensions</h2>
There have been continuous efforts over time to strengthen transatlantic cooperation and facilitate trade in the clean energy sector. Initiatives such as the Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) and the US-EU Energy Council have played a key role in advancing collaboration, fostering policy alignment, and promoting innovation between the US and Europe to achieve decarbonisation. However, while the EU has historically had an ambitious commitment to climate action—as seen in the Green Deal and climate targets—a recent shift to a more tech-inclusive approach has made it more prone to cooperation with the US.
Indeed, Mario Draghi’s report, titled <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en">The Future of European Competitiveness</a>, emphasizes the EU’s new commitment to a more flexible energy strategy—balancing decarbonisation with business-friendly practices—bringing it closer to the US’ historical stance on energy policy. While this approach is relatively new for the EU, who’s been traditionally focused more on regulatory-driven solutions, Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) has long been <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/publications">its advocate</a>, and such a change marks a key opportunity for cross-atlantic energy industry cooperation. Both the US and the EU are now aligned on the need to deploy flexible technologies and boost the competitiveness of their energy industries to strengthen their global leadership. 
Decarbonisation as an industrial strategy is key to increasing competitiveness in a rapidly evolving global energy market. However, a core takeaway of the <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en">Draghi report</a> is that no single region can secure supply chains or outcompete global competitors like China and Russia. Instead, the US and EU must work together to strengthen the clean energy economy to ensure it is competitive, secure, and innovation-driven.
Existing trade agreements and strategic alliances, such as NATO and the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), already provide a framework for stability, secure supply chains, and economic resilience. In an era of geopolitical uncertainty, it will be crucial to keep this safe transatlantic environment—one that fosters secure trade, manufacturing, and investment without the disruptions posed by external geopolitical competitors. Existing joint projects, such as shared renewable energy infrastructure and the development of nuclear power plants, are a proof of the success of this framework, as they boost energy security by reducing dependence on external competitors such as China which has been expanding its influence in the global energy market. Chinese investments alone account for <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2024/china">one-third</a> of clean energy investments worldwide. These partnerships enhance energy security while driving job creation and technological exchange in clean energy.
Cooperation also promotes economic growth by <a href="https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/united-states_en#:~:text=Bilateral%20trade%20and%20investment%20support,of%20the%20Atlantic%20are%20supported.">fostering job creation</a> in the clean energy sector through a mutual exchange of technology, skills, and knowledge, as seen through the DOE-led initiative,<a href="https://www.energy.gov/ia/partnership-transatlantic-energy-and-climate-cooperation-p-tecc"> Partnership for Transatlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation</a> (P-TECC). P-TECC aims to boost energy cooperation between the US and Central and Eastern European countries by reducing reliance on Russian energy, as the Commission is set to further its efforts on this topic through the upcoming Roadmap Towards Ending Dependence on Russian Fuel in March 2025, creating economic opportunities, and accelerating clean energy adoption. Such a framework also ensures that workers are trained for the right technologies, which facilitates the development of transatlantic projects, either in the US or in the EU, as an alternative to initiatives led by competitors. 
A key issue at stake: Under the Trump administration, US tariffs on Chinese goods may drive China to offload its overproduction in Europe, disrupting markets, including the potential for unfair competition and undermining pricing structures. In this context, a EU-US partnership must collaborate and lead on the deployment of mutually beneficial clean energy projects and technologies through joint policies, regulations, trade agreements, and other commercial initiatives facilitating fair access to the US and European markets.  
<h2>Protecting Transatlantic Prosperity: US-EU Cooperation Amid Trade Challenges </h2>
During his campaign, Trump had signaled his intention to impose tariffs on the EU, which he <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-warned-to-prepare-for-early-donald-trump-tariff-action-us/">confirmed</a> after taking office. Following his decision to impose tariffs on Canada and Mexico, President Trump cited concerns over the significant US trade deficit with the region. In response, the EU, though it has repeatedly mentioned it would collaborate with its transatlantic partner, is preparing for a potential retaliation.
However, the start of a transatlantic trade war will likely benefit China, as EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas pointed out. “We need America, and America needs us as well,” she <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/eu-trump-tariffs-1.7448782">said</a> last week. Indeed, such protectionist measures risk undermining the broader economic and security cooperation between the US and EU—particularly in the context of shared challenges from Russia and China. Russia remains the most immediate security risk—especially after its invasion of Ukraine—while China continues to pose a long-term strategic challenge in technology, critical minerals, and economic influence. 
To address these challenges and counter the threats to industries and economic competitiveness, the US and EU must balance their national interests with the need for cooperation on strategic issues. Divisions on trade would only undermine their shared goals; instead, aligning policies to secure supply chains, invest in clean energy, and reduce reliance on hostile nations is essential. By presenting a united front both regions can enhance economic resilience and strengthen their position against geopolitical threats. In clean energy, a united US-EU front is more cost-effective and impactful than fragmented efforts, both for securing jobs and leading the global market. They can secure critical supply chains through mutually beneficial agreements and maintain a competitive edge in emerging industries, thus ensuring energy security and leadership. 
<img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/3XPXJtejuxSqBFhTKXvste/1c94124427869c86d240de5433a51b09/Trump_vdl.jpg" alt="" width="754" height="425">
Given that demand for clean energy is rising globally, the EU and the US have a strategic opportunity to lead the global clean energy economy. As Ursula von der Leyen <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_25_404">noted</a>, millions of American jobs depend on European trade and companies, underscoring the deep economic interdependence between these markets. Additionally, developing nations require vast amounts of steel and cement to build essential infrastructure, including electrical grids, transportation networks and urban developments. The EU and US should strive to be the main providers of these key infrastructures and technologies, and this can only be done through joint collaboration. The EU’s recent <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/10017eb1-4722-4333-add2-e0ed18105a34_en">Competitiveness Compass</a> highlights the crucial role of governments, noting that key policy levers—such as taxation, labor markets, and industrial policies—are largely controlled by EU member states. To drive progress, it calls for coordinated national reforms and investment through a Competitiveness Coordination Tool. The Compass makes the goal clear: Europe must become more business-friendly to keep pace with the US and China while maintaining its climate commitments.
Harmonising policies—such as coordinating <a href="https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/taxation/excise-taxes/revision-energy-taxation-directive_en">tax incentives</a>, <a href="https://fsr.eui.eu/contracts-for-difference/#:~:text=What%20are%20Contracts-for-Difference%20%28CfDs%29%3F%20Contract-for-Difference%20%28CfD%29%20is%20a,used%20to%20protect%20consumers%20against%20high%20electricity%20prices.">Contracts for Difference (CFDs)</a>, and integrating the EU’s <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/product/what-american-manufacturers-need-to-know-about-the-eu-cbam">CBAM</a> with US and UK frameworks—would strengthen transatlantic industrial leadership. Without coordination, fragmented policies could weaken market leadership, allowing China’s cheaper, <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/co2-emissions-in-2023/the-changing-landscape-of-global-emissions">high-emission</a> alternatives to dominate. A cohesive transatlantic strategy will strengthen supply chains, accelerate innovation, safeguard jobs, and enhance long-term economic resilience in the clean energy sector.
<h2>Competitive Strength Through Cooperation: A Transatlantic Path to Energy Security</h2>
With impending threats to their energy markets, the US and EU must coordinate to maintain their leadership on the global stage, in line with their recent alignment on competitiveness strategies. Building on the momentum of its Competitiveness Compass and its upcoming Clean Industrial Deal, the next EU mandate should focus its transatlantic efforts on the following areas: 
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Harmonise Regulations and Market Standards for Clean Energy Technologies: As the EU has reaffirmed in its Competitiveness Compass, it should aim to harmonise its single market and simplify its regulations across member states. The goal is to facilitate access to its market and boost its competitiveness. This would entail a clear alignment on standards and certification processes for clean energy technologies to facilitate transatlantic trade and deployment. 
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Deploy Effective Financing Mechanisms: The EU and the US should establish a transatlantic clean energy investment fund to support companies working on emerging technologies, and promote mechanisms to de-risk project costs. Additionally, they should encourage joint ventures between EU and U.S. based companies through tax incentives and investment guarantees. 
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Leverage and Align Trade Agreements Across Member States: Since the effectiveness of EU-US trade agreements will be heavily tied to the tariff policy, the EU should focus on leveraging existing bilateral agreements between individual Member States and the US and harmonise them across the EU. This would entail ensuring that Member States follow specific EU guidelines that favor secure supply chains for clean energy deployments when engaging in bilateral trade agreements with the US. 
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The EU-US relationship is set to evolve significantly in the coming months as the Commission and the second Trump administration establish new norms for cooperation. Both the EU and the US are striving to be more competitive on the global stage, but instead of vying for individual dominance, they can use this as an opportunity for transatlantic cooperation. As both regions are converging on industrial growth, supply chain resilience, and economic security, it is vital that the US and EU partner in establishing a competitive edge over foreign adversaries. In the race for geopolitical influence via energy and its industries, Carbon-Free Europe will continue to support opportunities for transatlantic leadership in energy security, competitiveness, and economic innovation through the deployment of all clean energy technologies.

Power, Policy, and Partnerships: EU-US Energy Security in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

Catherine Grossman

Catherine-Grossman

Special Advisor

Maya Lameche

Policy Associate, Boundary Stone Partners

UKEUUS HG2

Memo

Europe’s Industrial Future is on the line –  The Clean Industrial Deal must deliver

Carbon Free Europe

CFE Icon 400x400

francois-genon-M5IuGintPvo-unsplash

Position

In anticipation of Poland’s submission of its updated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP/KPEiK) to the European Commission in June 2024, Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) commissioned Evolved Energy Research, in collaboration with the Silesian University of Technology (SUT), the Institute of Power Engineering - National Research Institute, and Princeton University’s Andlinger Center, to conduct an extensive energy systems modelling study. The objective of the two-phase project is to delineate pathways for Poland to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, thereby informing not only the NECP revision but also future policies, national strategies, and long-term investments.
The two-phase Net-Zero Poland (NZP) study provides a first-of-its-kind, detailed and transparent articulation of alternative pathways for Poland to transition to net-zero emissions by 2050. The study aims to inform energy-transition strategy, policy formulation, and investment decision making in both the public and private sectors. Below you can find the results of the first phase of the project, which was led by CFE and provides critical and data-based insights on a national and international level. The second phase, led by SUT, will use the data to run a higher spatial resolution model that enables key land-use, socio-technical, environmental, and investment challenges to be discussed at the voivodeship, powiat, and gminas level.
Poland’s energy landscape remains more heavily reliant on fossil fuels compared to other EU Member States. Because of this, Poland faces unique challenges to meet the EU’s ambitious emissions reduction targets under the Fit for 55 package, while ensuring coal regions are not left behind and energy prices remain affordable. The <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/publications/poland-draft-updated-necp-2021-2030_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">NECP draft update</a> sets ambitious targets for Poland, aiming for a 29.8% share of renewable energy sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption by 2030 (compared to 9.4% in 2022).1
With a well-designed implementation strategy, Poland can achieve a just transition, zero-emission energy system, and improved air quality as outlined in the proposed <a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/climate/energy-policy-of-poland-until-2040-epp2040" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 (PEP2040)</a>. This strategy relies on a diverse energy mix to be successful, including accelerating renewable deployment alongside nuclear energy. 
Our analysis explored eight different pathways for Poland to reach net-zero, each of which has different cost implications and feasibility risks. In this report, we highlight results in six key areas: 1) achieving clean heat, 2) future of coal with carbon capture and storage, 3) role of nuclear energy, 4) renewable resource availability, 5) essential hydrogen interconnector, and 6) electric vehicles.
The full technical report can be found <a href="https://assets.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2iDzvF9Di2nVrTywjEAdER/dbdcc3fbbd738d4abd902d190f4f1507/Poland_NECP_Analysis.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>. A full data Tableau with interactive results can be found at the end of this publication.
<h2>Achieving Clean Heat</h2>
Achieving a clean and decarbonised heating system for Poland requires two main strategies 1) replacing in-home coal and biomass boilers with heat pumps and 2) decarbonising steam supply for district heating and industry. Today, around 60% of residential buildings rely on coal or biomass boilers, 35% on district heating systems, and 5% on heat pumps. In our Core pathway, the percentage of homes with heat pumps needs to jump to 17% by 2030 and 45% by 2050. These heat pumps replace in-home coal and biomass boilers while district heating systems are preserved and decarbonised upstream. To achieve this goal, Poland requires a supply chain to install heat pumps in over 200,000 homes per year and more than quadruple electricity supply by 2050. 
Below you can see how steam for district heating, as well as industry, is decarbonised. Currently, steam is principally produced through coal power plants and boilers. The coal phaseout for steam production is achieved primarily through the deployment of large heat pumps, with some gasification in the short-term. Beyond 2030, nuclear facilities also play an important role in providing steam, providing up to 14% of supply.
<h4>Figure 1: Steam production across all modelled pathways.</h4>
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<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/SteamSupply_NZP/STEAMSUPPLY?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:redirect=auth&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
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<h2>Future of Coal with Carbon Capture and Storage</h2>
Our pathway “High Coal w/ CCS” models what would happen if Poland were to keep coal in its energy economy system with up to 15 GW of coal capacity by 2050, equal to about 50% of the current fleet. We ran this pathway not to recommend preserving coal capacity, but to demonstrate the trade-offs in a strategy banking on carbon capture technology with coal or hoping to delay renewable deployment for future technology breakthroughs. As you can see in Figure 2, keeping coal creates a lower need for gas power compared to the Core pathway, but it does not negate the need for nuclear and renewables.
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Figure 2: Electricity capacity in the “Core” versus the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway
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<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/ElectricCapacity_NZP/ELECTRICCAPACITY?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
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There are two potentially insurmountable challenges with the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway: 1) costs and 2) carbon capture transport and storage infrastructure needs. A future bound to coal is the highest cost pathway and extremely expensive toward 2050 with at least 8.0 billion EUR more investments compared to our "Core" Pathway in the year of 2050 alone. It also requires over 100 megatons (Mt) of CO2 exports annually on top of an annual 20 Mt domestic CO2 sequestration and some domestic CO2 utilisation (Figure 3). Achieving these scales of operations for both sequestration and export requires careful planning. Expanding CO2 pipelines to Germany and other Central European countries as well as the Nordics is required in all pathways, but needs to be scaled up significantly in the case of keeping coal within the energy system.
Irrespective of the economics of CO2 pipelines and deployment of carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) technology, Poland will need to adhere to the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive (<a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive-targets-and-rules/renewable-energy-directive_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener">RED III</a>) and account for ageing coal infrastructure that will need replacement regardless of climate targets.
<h4>Figure 3: Carbon capture sequestration in Poland, export, and utilisation.</h4>
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<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/CarbonManagement_NZP/CARBONMANAGEMENT?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
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<h2>Role of Nuclear Energy</h2>
In all our model pathways nuclear energy plays a significant role in providing zero carbon electricity for the power sector as well as steam for industrial processes and district heating (see “Achieving Clean Heat”) and hydrogen production (see “Essential Hydrogen Interconnector”). We consider the potential of different sizes and types of reactors, including large light water reactors and advanced small modular reactors. 
In the power sector, nuclear energy provides 19 GW of electric capacity by 2050 in our “Core” pathway. With less nuclear deployment due to cost constraints, represented with our “High Nuclear Costs” pathway, Poland would need to deploy more than three times the capacity of alternative clean energy resources. Figure 4 shows that replacing 19 GW of nuclear energy requires building more than 70 GW of alternative resources including majority solar, offshore wind, gas, and storage. The total electric capacity needs to be higher to provide the same electricity generation, including an increased gas peaker capacity and more electric storage to balance the grid. 
<h4>Figure 4: Change in electricity capacity for the “High Nuclear Costs” pathways compared to “Core”</h4>
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<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/ElectricCapacityDiff_NZP/ELECTRICCAPACITYDIFFERENCE?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="1051" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
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Offshore wind power becomes especially important in any pathway with limited nuclear energy deployment as solar and onshore wind power are using almost all available resources (see Figure 6). As you can see in Figure 5, the technologies have an inverse deployment relationship. High nuclear cost increases offshore wind demand and vice versa as shown by the “High Offshore Wind Costs” pathway. Considering cost and subsequent deployment uncertainties, a flexible framework that incentivizes the buildout of both nuclear and offshore wind is necessary.
<h4>Figure 5: Electricity generation across all modelled scenarios.</h4>
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<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/ElectricityGeneration_NZP/ELECTRICITYGENERATION?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
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<h2>Renewable Resource Availability</h2>
The EU requires Poland to reach 42.5% renewables in final energy consumption by 2030, a target that Poland can reach considering wind and solar resource potential. In our analysis, we consider the potential of renewable resources based on land use availability, resource quality, and relative economics compared to other clean energy resources. Reaching this target for final energy consumption will require Poland to ramp up its current power sector target of 50% renewables by 2030 and the electrification of the transportation sector (see “Electric Vehicles”). Our pathways suggest Poland should achieve 60-66% renewables in the power sector by 2030 even while total electricity generation increases by 50% compared to 2022.
Below you can see the Wind and Solar Resource Potential for Poland (orange) and how much of the renewable resources are used in each pathway over time (blue) to meet the renewable energy share. Onshore wind is a valuable resource that is maxed out in all pathways by 2040, except in a pathway where we explicitly prevent additional onshore wind builds. The vast majority of fixed offshore wind resources are used up over time as well and most pathways are also tapping into more expensive floating offshore wind resources. If nuclear power is prevented due to high cost or if onshore wind cannot be deployed, both fixed and floating offshore wind resources are facing maximum use. Solar is deployed across all pathways and large-scale deployment is maxed out if nuclear deployment is limited.
<h4>Figure 6: Wind and solar resource potential.</h4>
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<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/ResourceUse_NZP/RESOURCEUSE?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
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<h2>Essential Hydrogen Interconnector</h2>
Poland is currently the third largest hydrogen producer (1.3 Mt H2/year2) and consumer (0.8 Mt H2/year3) in Europe and fifth largest producer in the world. Building on this workforce and experience, Poland can establish a clean hydrogen industry that fulfils domestic hydrogen demand (a key priority for energy security) and interconnects and exports hydrogen from the Baltics to Germany and other nations in need. 
Figure 7 shows Poland’s domestic hydrogen production. Across all pathways, Poland can leverage its hydrogen experience, future nuclear and offshore power, and biomass resources to become a large-scale hydrogen producer. The “High Biomass” pathway sees the most hydrogen product due to expanded BECCS hydrogen and nuclear heat electrolysis potential.
Poland’s strategic location makes it an essential hydrogen interconnector for pipelines between the Baltics and Germany and other Central European countries. As shown in Figure 7, Poland can take hydrogen from the Baltics and domestic production, use it as a feedstock to produce e-fuels and ammonia, and export these alternative fuels. Fostering collaboration and strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries will create a cohesive regional hydrogen and alternative fuel network, leveraging an economic opportunity for Poland as a hydrogen interconnector.
<h4>Figure 7: Hydrogen supply and demand</h4>
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<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/HydrogenDemand_NZP/HYDROGENDEMAND?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:redirect=auth&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="955" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
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<h2>Electric Vehicles</h2>
Early and large-scale electrification, especially of the transportation sector, plays a vital role in the transition to a net-zero emissions economy. The difference between a short-term (“Core” pathway) and long-term electrification (“Slow Consumer Uptake” pathway) in transportation is a much higher price tag during a delayed transportation electrification. 
Below are the additional costs or savings by 2030 or 2050 compared to our Reference pathway that does not achieve net-zero emissions. On the one hand, slow electrification in transportation saves money in the near-term as no or little investments are made into electric vehicle infrastructure. On the other hand, slow electrification ends up costing significantly more money in the long-term because the system has little build-out of cost- and energy-efficient EV infrastructure and requires a higher dependency on expensive zero-emissions liquid fuels to achieve net-zero targets.
The electric vehicle deployment differences between the Core and Slow Consumer Uptake pathway are significant. In the most economic Core pathway, Poland will have 8.5 million passenger and 660,000 freight EVs by 2030. In the Slow Consumer Uptake pathway, only 1.9 million passenger and 220,000 freight EVs will be in Poland by 2030—a third to a quarter of the capacity of the Core pathway.
<h4>Figure 8: Transportation system costs across scenarios compared to Reference.</h4>
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<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/TransportationNetCosts_NZP/TransportNETCOST?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="800" height="550" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
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<h4>To explore all of our results from NZP see below the full data Tableau.</h4>
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<iframe class="tableauPlaceholder" src="https://public.tableau.com/views/Results_NZP/NZP?:language=en-US&amp;:sid=&amp;:display_count=n&amp;:origin=viz_share_link:showVizHome=no&amp;:embed=true" width="950" height="650" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe><img class="tableau-fallback-image">
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<h3><a href="https://carbonfreeeurope.imgix.net/Polands-Pathways-to-Net-Zero-Emissions.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click here to view the full PDF. </a></h3>

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