What does a nuclear revival mean for the EU’s decarbonisation perspectives?

Europe’s renewed embrace of nuclear energy seems to mark a turning point in the Union’s energy strategy, marking a clear shift toward pragmatic, tech-inclusive decarbonisation strategy.

 

Why are we writing this at CFE? CFE supports a tech-inclusive decarbonisation strategy, which translates into an EU energy mix that includes nuclear among a set of other solutions. The goal with this memo is to demonstrate that the renewed interest in nuclear energy highlights how tech-inclusivity is crucial to Europe’s energy future, and how nuclear can and should be a part of the solution.

Key Definitions: 

• Conventional nuclear reactors: The term typically designates large-scale nuclear power plants (Generation II reactors) with a power output ranging from 500 to 1,300 MWe, characterized by their use of water as both a coolant and a neutron moderator. Typically, these consist of pressurized water reactors (PWRs) or boiling water reactors (BWRs). They have been in operation since the 1970s and are the most common type found worldwide. 
• Advanced nuclear reactors: These are reactors that incorporate significant improvements over current commercial reactors, encompassing enhanced safety features, greater efficiency and the use of alternative coolants and fuels. They typically include Generation III+ and IV reactors. 
• AP1000 reactor: The AP1000 is a Generation III+ PWR developed by Westinghouse. It is designed to produce a power output of approximately 1,117 MWe and features advanced passive safety systems that reduce the number of components required, making it a more compact and cost-effective reactor. 
• Small Modular Reactors (SMRs): SMRs are a type  of advanced nuclear reactors characterized by their small size and modular design, with a typical power output of up to 300 MWe. SMRs are designed to be factory-built and transported to installation sites. As of 2025, China and Russia are the only countries with operational SMRs, though 80 reactor designs are in development across 19 countries.

From a splurge of Member States announcements to wider EU policies, the introduction of nuclear power as a pillar of decarbonisation seems to be on its way. However, its long-standing controversial position in EU and national politics bears the question of the implications of this new stance on nuclear energy. This piece seeks to understand how and why this change underscores the EU’s embracement of a tech-inclusive approach to decarbonisation, and what policies can support this approach.

A Nuclear Revival on Multiple Fronts

The EU’s nuclear renaissance is materialising through multiple avenues—new reactor builds, lifetime or restart of existing reactors, and political openness—and on two-levels—institutional, at the EU level; and operational, at the Member State level.

Institutionally, recent EU initiatives are reflecting a clear strategic commitment to integrating nuclear energy into the EU’s broader energy and industrial strategy. First, the launch of the EU SMR Alliance in February 2024, composed of 12 EU Member States, marked a significant milestone. The initiative aims to accelerate the development, demonstration and deployment of European SMRs by the early 2030s. It seeks to reduce dependence on foreign energy technologies by focusing on the deployment of advanced reactors modeled by European companies, while contributing to decarbonising Europe’s power supply with reliable baseload sources through SMRs. In parallel, EU policy shifts have also demonstrated a step forward towards including more nuclear power as part of the suite of all decarbonisation solutions. In 2024, the Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA) recognised nuclear technologies as part of the list of strategic net-zero technologies, explicitly listed in Article 4 of the Regulation. Additionally, reforms to the EU electricity market design now allow for mechanisms like contracts for difference (CfDs) to support both the lifetime extension of existing reactors and investment in new nuclear capacity—tools that create greater investment certainty. The recent adoption of the Nuclear Illustrative Programme (PINC report) on investment needs by the Commission (June 13) further illustrates the growing policy momentum in the sector. While introducing no new policy or financing commitments, this update - the first since 2017 - signals renewed recognition of the nuclear sector's strategic importance, contrasting with the Commission's previous lack of engagement with nuclear energy. 

At the Member State level, a growing number of countries who have been historically against nuclear energy are taking concrete steps on three fronts: postponing nuclear phaseout through lifetime expansion of reactors or the restart of already existing ones, increasing political openness to nuclear power and affirming commitment to building new reactors. Earlier this year, Belgium’s new coalition government announced plans to extend the operation of two nuclear reactors for an additional 10 years until 2036, beyond the previously agreed extension. Denmark is planning to reassess its 40-year ban on nuclear energy, citing interest in SMRs and Italy is also revisiting its stance on nuclear energy by evaluating the feasibility of reintroducing nuclear power into its energy mix. Meanwhile, Finland launched the first phase of its nuclear programme in 2024 aimed at constructing an SMR for district heating in Helsinki, and Slovakia’s government approved plans to construct a new nuclear reactor at the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear plant in 2023. Together, these recent developments indicate a broad and growing consensus across the EU that nuclear energy in addition to renewables, hydrogen, and carbon management will play a critical role in achieving energy security and climate neutrality.

How Nuclear Contributes to the EU’s decarbonisation goals 

If Member States are increasingly looking to nuclear as a part of their decarbonised energy mix, it is primarily because of its ability to provide a stable, dispatchable source of low carbon electricity. Nuclear power is not subject to intermittency, can support grid reliability, and has an enormous potential to contribute to EU-wide decarbonisation. CFE’s 2024 Annual Decarbonisation Perspectives (ADP) modelling demonstrates that in the fastest and most economic energy transition scenario (Core) for the EU to reach net-zero by 2050, nuclear power capacity would increase from 100 GW today to 186 GW by 2050 (77GW over what the PINC report shows), accounting for 5.4% of total electric capacity but generating 16% of all the EU’s electricity supply.  

In Europe, countries like France offer a compelling case study regarding the contribution of nuclear to decarbonisation: around 70% of the country’s electricity mix comes from nuclear, and the country has one of the lowest GHG emissions per capita in the EU largely due to its high reliance on nuclear power. While it can be argued that France’s success story mostly hinges on its early commitment to nuclear energy in the 1970s with the Messmer Plan, and that it would be very hard to reach such levels of nuclear power in any country’s mix today, France’s story demonstrates how large reactors can serve as decarbonisation tools, beyond the promise of SMRs that a lot of EU countries are looking at. It should be acknowledged by EU Member States that until SMRs are developed and deployed in the EU, large nuclear reactors will continue to play a  significant role in decarbonisation efforts until 2040 at least. 

Poland exemplifies this process well. As highlighted by CFE’s 2024 ADP, Poland is among several Central and Eastern European countries for which nuclear energy is essential to meeting climate targets and reducing reliance on coal, which represents 70% of its electricity generation, making decarbonisation particularly challenging. Central to Poland’s plans to decarbonise is its partnership with Westinghouse and Bechtel to advance its first nuclear power plant at the Lubiatowo-Kopalino site. The project will deploy three AP1000 reactors delivering up to 3.75GW of clean electricity. Construction for the project is expected to begin in 2026 with operations set to begin in 2040. Once operational, the plant is expected to generate approximately 22 TWh annually, representing around 13% of the national electricity demand from 2023 (166 TWh). This output could replace up to 25% of coal-fired generation (Ember data from 2024), which would substantially reduce emissions while enhancing energy independence.

A clear change in nuclear’s perception in the EU 

Cognizant of the benefits of nuclear energy, it is now clear how nuclear's perception is shifting within the EU. Once treated with skepticism, notably following the Tchernobyl and Fukushima incidents, nuclear is increasingly becoming a vital component of the EU’s decarbonisation, affordability and energy security strategy. It is a reliable, low-carbon and mature technology that can provide large-scale electricity without the emissions associated with fossil fuels. SMRs are showing promise of a more dispatchable reactor design, with the volume of waste generated remaining relatively small and manageable through advanced storage and potential recycling solutions. 

This means that EU policymakers, institutions and stakeholders can and should speak more openly—and holistically—about the benefits of nuclear alongside renewables, especially as Member States, even those with a historic reluctance to nuclear, seek to incorporate more nuclear power in their mix. Germany, a country long associated with its anti-nuclear stance, has seen renewed debate about the role of nuclear energy in energy security. Recent developments indicate a shift in the German government's position toward endorsing the principle of technological neutrality, ensuring non-discriminatory treatment of nuclear energy within EU energy policy and equal treatment with renewables. Such changes will require a holistic understanding of how nuclear power can be deployed and incorporated into EU and national frameworks. 

Beyond climate considerations, nuclear power can also help counteract the effects of the energy security crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. For countries heavily reliant on imported fossil fuels, nuclear energy can serve as a more viable alternative to  enhance resilience against price shocks and geopolitical pressure. The majority of uranium that powers reactors comes from places outside of Russia¹, and as such, nuclear’s firm power potential offers an essential hedge against volatility. Moreover, nuclear development can strengthen the EU’s competitive position globally. By fostering innovation and scaling up domestic nuclear capacity, particularly through the development of SMRs, the EU can avoid overreliance on U.S. or Chinese suppliers and develop its own nuclear projects. It can also leverage its leadership to export European reactors to its partners in Africa and beyond. 

As such, by adding nuclear to the core clean energy technologies including renewables, hydrogen, and carbon management, the EU has the opportunity to remain competitive in the global energy race while reducing its strategic dependencies. This clearly aligns with the goals laid out in the Clean Industrial Deal and the Competitiveness Compass, both tying back to the need of engaging in a tech-inclusive approach to decarbonisation—one that leverages nuclear alongside all other carbon-free technologies—to achieve the EU’s climate targets while ensuring economic growth and security.

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Policy Recommendations 

If allocated the right resources, nuclear power can play a significant role alongside other energy sources to reinforce the EU’s sovereignty, economic strength and climate leadership.