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<p><span>As part of implementing the emissions reduction targets outlined in the European Green Deal, Romania has adopted its Long-Term Strategy (LTS) for Decarbonisation until 2050 and is currently revising its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP). To support Romania in finalising these strategies, Carbon-Free Europe (CFE), in partnership with <a href="https://www.evolved.energy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evolved Energy Research</a> and the <a href="https://www.enpg.ro/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Energy Policy Group</a> (EPG), have developed a detailed energy systems model to outline clear steps Romania can take to hit its 2030, 2040, and 2050 climate targets while driving economic growth.</span></p>
<p><span>This analysis explores multiple decarbonisation pathways for Romania, considering combinations of all carbon-free technologies and policies that can guide Romania towards climate neutrality. The study highlights key measures for policymakers and broader stakeholders  to consider  including expanding clean energy capacities, electrifying key sectors, reducing final energy consumption, and limiting natural gas investments.</span></p>
<p><span>Romania’s energy landscape is currently characterised by its reliance on coal and natural gas, making the transition to clean energy a complex challenge. To meet the EU’s ambitious climate targets, including a 55% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, the country will need to accelerate its shift to clean energy, increase energy efficiency, and invest in new technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and hydrogen. Deploying and expanding CCS and hydrogen infrastructure by 2030 and beyond will play a critical role in decarbonising Romania’s industry and ensuring energy security. </span></p>
<p><span>With the right combination of clean technologies and policies, Romania can not only decarbonise its economy in line with the EU’s net-zero commitments, but ensure continued economic growth and durable energy security. This study provides Romania with insights into realistic pathways to meet climate targets, offering clear, data-driven scenarios. For more detailed analysis, click here for the full <u><a title="https://www.enpg.ro/pathways-for-decarbonising-romanias-economy/" href="https://www.enpg.ro/pathways-for-decarbonising-romanias-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-ogsc="" data-outlook-id="142b919b-4b27-4048-8d5c-f760c69ebcdb">policy paper</a></u>, and deep dives on <u><a title="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-carbon-capture-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" href="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-carbon-capture-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-ogsc="" data-outlook-id="68691cad-f839-478a-b7f9-ca423556cb10">CCS</a></u> and <u><a title="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-hydrogen-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" href="https://www.enpg.ro/the-role-of-hydrogen-in-romanias-low-carbon-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-ogsc="" data-outlook-id="57661c73-23fc-43af-90e6-9b161b60cbe9">hydrogen</a>.</u></span></p>
<p><span>To explore all of our results, see below the full data Tableau.</span></p>
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Pathways for Decarbonising Romania’s Economy

<p>Beware of declarations that the recent European parliamentary elections offered a clear verdict on the continent’s politics. It was neither the endorsement of the far-right that many feared nor the validation of the status quo that would make governing easy for the next five years. The European People’s Party (EPP), which leads the current EU governing coalition and is the home of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, remains in power. The agenda enacted over the past five years will remain in place. The results, however, are a cautionary tale. Policymakers and NGOs must quickly adapt to a future that could prove to be even more unstable than today’s economic and political turmoil.</p>
<p>Europe did dodge the bullet of a far-right sweep of the parliamentary elections. Voters across the Nordic countries, in much of Central and Eastern Europe, and on the Iberian peninsula backed mainstream parties. The news, however, was different in Europe’s three most populous and economically powerful countries, Germany, France, and Italy. There, far-right nationalist parties continued their march into the mainstream, offering a much more complex scenario for the future of Europe and the fate of clean energy and climate policy.  </p>
<p>The EU cannot maintain the status quo of how climate policy is formulated and communicated to voters. These policies, and how they are discussed, are alienating large groups of Europeans who feel left behind and disenfranchised. This is being exacerbated by populist extremists on both ideological fringes, particularly on the far-right. The question now is whether governments, political institutions, and NGO communities that have created Europe’s climate and clean energy agenda can adapt quickly enough to reassure Europeans and rebuff the far-right where it remains strong or is growing.</p>
<h4>The Implications for the Next EU Parliament and Legislative Agenda</h4>
<p>The conclusion of the European parliamentary election is only the start of the process of determining the next EU political leadership and ruling majority.  National delegations will now enter into negotiations to form the European political groups—large groupings of cross-national political families. While these negotiations are ongoing, the center-right EPP, which has secured the largest number of seats in parliament, is expected to solidify the ongoing majority coalition with the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D) and classic liberal Renew Europe. The far-right nationalist ID Party, and unaffiliated nationalist parties like Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD), will likely be excluded from the next government, though the European Conservative and Reformists (ECR) group may align with the EPP’s majority position on some issues. This balance of power in the Parliament will also determine the political leadership in other key EU institutions, including the appointment of the next European Commission President.</p>
<p>However the next EU government emerges, we expect the EU Parliament and Commission to follow only a slightly more center-right policy agenda than the current status quo. Current European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who has been in office since 2019, is likely to receive a second term. This means continued implementation of the Green Deal, industrial competitiveness, and the EU climate commitments enacted since 2019 remain in place.</p>
<p>It is, however, an open question as to how much new legislation the next government can enact, especially with a potentially narrower majority. A more empowered set of far-right and nationalist parties could cause more disruption and attempt to slow policymaking down. Even here the far-right’s actions are unpredictable. These parties are fragmented. While most are aligned in opposition to migration and criticism of enacted climate action, they hold conflicting views on how to deal with Russia and China and where they fall regarding Euroscepticism. They could try to undermine Europe’s unity in support of Ukraine and the overall strengthening of the Union, but that path is far from certain. Issues like agriculture, biodiversity, and migration policy could become more tenuous, with coalition partnerships shifting based on the topic. This will lead to more tension, less predictability, and potentially more protracted negotiations over some files.</p>
<h4>National Influence of the European Election</h4>
<p>We should also look at the results of the EU elections from a Member State by Member State perspective. Contrary to many headlines, there was not a far-right wave across the continent. Results can be divided into two camps. The far-right gained or reinforced their support in Europe’s three largest countries, Germany, France, and Italy. It failed to live up to expectations almost everywhere else, notably in Spain, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, and even Hungary.</p>
<p>The biggest takeaway from Germany, France, and Italy is the normalizing of the far-right. The AfD in Germany, the National Rally in France, and the Brothers of Italy all trace their roots to World War II-era fascist parties. Until Brothers of Italy leader Giorgia Meloni became Italian Prime Minister in October 2022, none had ever gained power.  During this election, France’s National Rally outperformed every other party, prompting President Emmanuel Macron to call a snap election for June 20 and July 7. If the National Rally emerges as the strongest party in France in these snap elections, yet another major European economy falls under the influence of the far-right. At the EU level, these three national far-right parties are not fully aligned and have not yet agreed to cooperate, with Meloni and the Brothers of Italy supporting Ukraine and the European Union, while AfD and National Rally are suspiciously pro-Russia.</p>
<p>Across the rest of Europe, there were a variety of national factors that led to the underperformance of the far-right. We shouldn’t read too much into the overall results and try to find pan-European trends. However, it is interesting to note that in several countries—Poland and Hungary in particular—incumbent or recently defeated far-right parties lost ground. This is in keeping with the global anti-incumbent mood among voters.  The combination of the mainstreaming of the far-right and general anti-incumbency sentiment will only make policymaking and navigating European politics more difficult.</p>
<h4>Lessons for Policymaking and Framing</h4>
<p>The broader challenge facing policymakers, political parties, and NGOs is how to interpret these results. There is a danger in viewing it as an endorsement of the past five years’ policies and framing of issues. Persistent voter discontent, a growing anti-incumbent backlash, and the mainstreaming of far-right nationalist parties point to systemic risk. The pace and the volume of legislation cannot continue in the next five years. Nor can it be oriented or framed around issues that many European voters feel are out of touch with, or negatively impact, their daily lives. The new EU leadership, and NGOs that support them, must be explicit about how the Green Deal’s implementation will help improve the lives of everyday Europeans, support industry and agriculture in the EU, and reduce costs.</p>
<p>Reframing the actions the EU has taken over the past five years, justifiably, around improving the continent’s security and competitiveness is an important start to addressing Europeans’ concerns. The next step is to use these policies to enable each Member State to take the actions that will accelerate decarbonization, and address the economic and security issues front and center in their citizens’ minds. If these policies, however, limit or are cast by the populist Right as limiting Europeans’ choices or increasing their costs in the name of “climate action,” the chance of creating an even greater backlash is significant.</p>
<h4>Conclusion</h4>
<p>It is still too early to form firm conclusions on the full impact of the EU elections, and the results were too varied to apply generalizations to the entire Union. Moving forward, members of the climate and energy community must acknowledge that a change of approach is needed in the new mandate to ensure the durability of the net-zero transition. Continuing to engage in technical support for policy implementation and highlighting the need for Transatlantic cooperation on these, ultimately global, issues is important. It is even more critical now to acknowledge and address voter discontent, which is also being exploited by the far-right. There is an opportunity here to build on some of the synergies across US and EU audiences to engage citizens who feel uneasy with the changes occurring, or more insecure because of the cost of living and security crises, and incorporate their concerns in building a broader vision for climate action that is centered around competitiveness, energy security, transatlantic cooperation, and democracy.</p>

EU Election: Short-Term Relief, but Long-Term Threat from the Far Right

<p><span>In anticipation of Poland’s submission of its updated National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP/KPEiK) to the European Commission in June 2024, </span><strong>Carbon-Free Europe (CFE)</strong><span> commissioned Evolved Energy Research, in collaboration with the Silesian University of Technology (SUT), the Institute of Power Engineering - National Research Institute, and Princeton University’s Andlinger Center, to conduct an </span><strong>extensive energy systems modelling study</strong><span>. The objective of the two-phase project is to </span><strong>delineate pathways for Poland to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050</strong><span>, thereby informing not only the NECP revision but also future policies, national strategies, and long-term investments.</span></p>
<p><span>The </span><strong>two-phase Net-Zero Poland (NZP) study</strong><span> provides a first-of-its-kind, detailed and transparent articulation of alternative pathways for Poland to transition to net-zero emissions by 2050. The study aims to inform energy-transition strategy, policy formulation, and investment decision making in both the public and private sectors. Below you can find the results of the</span><strong> first phase </strong><span>of the project, which was </span><strong>led by CFE</strong><span> and provides critical and data-based insights on a national and international level. The </span><strong>second phase, led by SUT</strong><span>, will use the data to run a higher spatial resolution model that enables key land-use, socio-technical, environmental, and investment challenges to be discussed at the voivodeship, powiat, and gminas level.</span></p>
<p><span>Poland’s energy landscape remains </span><strong>more heavily reliant on fossil fuels</strong><span> compared to other EU Member States. Because of this, Poland faces unique challenges to meet the EU’s ambitious emissions reduction targets under the Fit for 55 package, while ensuring coal regions are not left behind and energy prices remain affordable. The </span><a href="https://commission.europa.eu/publications/poland-draft-updated-necp-2021-2030_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>NECP draft update</span></a><span> sets </span><strong>ambitious targets for Poland</strong><span>, aiming for a 29.8% share of renewable energy sources (RES) in gross final energy consumption by 2030 (compared to 9.4% in 2022).</span><span><sup>1</sup></span></p>
<p><span>With a well-designed implementation strategy, Poland can achieve a just transition, zero-emission energy system, and improved air quality as outlined in the proposed </span><a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/climate/energy-policy-of-poland-until-2040-epp2040" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>Energy Policy of Poland until 2040 (PEP2040)</span></a><span>. This strategy relies on a </span><strong>diverse energy mix to be successful</strong><span>, including accelerating renewable deployment alongside nuclear energy. </span></p>
<p><span>Our analysis explored </span><strong>eight different pathways for Poland to reach net-zero</strong><span>, each of which has different cost implications and feasibility risks. In this report, we </span><strong>highlight results in six key areas</strong><span>: 1) achieving clean heat, 2) future of coal with carbon capture and storage, 3) role of nuclear energy, 4) renewable resource availability, 5) essential hydrogen interconnector, and 6) electric vehicles.</span></p>
<p><span>The full technical report can be found <a href="https://assets.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2iDzvF9Di2nVrTywjEAdER/dbdcc3fbbd738d4abd902d190f4f1507/Poland_NECP_Analysis.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">here</a>. A full data Tableau with interactive results can be found at the end of this publication.</span></p>
<h2><span>Achieving Clean Heat</span></h2>
<p><span>Achieving a clean and decarbonised heating system for Poland requires two main strategies 1) replacing in-home coal and biomass boilers with heat pumps and 2) decarbonising steam supply for district heating and industry. Today, around 60% of residential buildings rely on coal or biomass boilers, 35% on district heating systems, and 5% on heat pumps. In our Core pathway, the percentage of homes with heat pumps needs to jump to 17% by 2030 and 45% by 2050. These heat pumps replace in-home coal and biomass boilers while district heating systems are preserved and decarbonised upstream. To achieve this goal, Poland requires a supply chain to install heat pumps in over 200,000 homes per year and more than quadruple electricity supply by 2050. </span></p>
<p><span>Below you can see how steam for district heating, as well as industry, is decarbonised. Currently, steam is principally produced through coal power plants and boilers. The coal phaseout for steam production is achieved primarily through the deployment of large heat pumps, with some gasification in the short-term. Beyond 2030, nuclear facilities also play an important role in providing steam, providing up to 14% of supply.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 1:</strong> Steam production across all modelled pathways.</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Future of Coal with Carbon Capture and Storage</span></h2>
<p><span>Our pathway “High Coal w/ CCS” models what would happen if Poland were to keep coal in its energy economy system with up to 15 GW of coal capacity by 2050, equal to about 50% of the current fleet. We ran this pathway not to recommend preserving coal capacity, but to demonstrate the trade-offs in a strategy banking on carbon capture technology with coal or hoping to delay renewable deployment for future technology breakthroughs. As you can see in Figure 2, keeping coal creates a lower need for gas power compared to the Core pathway, but it does not negate the need for nuclear and renewables.</span></p>
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<strong>Figure 2: </strong><span>Electricity capacity in the “Core” versus the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway</span>
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<p><span>There are two potentially insurmountable challenges with the “High Coal w/ CCS” pathway: 1) costs and 2) carbon capture transport and storage infrastructure needs. A future bound to coal is the highest cost pathway and extremely expensive toward 2050 with at least 8.0 billion EUR more investments compared to our "Core" Pathway in the year of 2050 alone. It also requires over 100 megatons (Mt) of CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> exports annually on top of an annual 20 Mt domestic CO<sub>2</sub></span><span> sequestration and some domestic CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> utilisation (</span><strong>Figure 3</strong><span>). Achieving these scales of operations for both sequestration and export requires careful planning. Expanding CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> pipelines to Germany and other Central European countries as well as the Nordics is required in all pathways, but needs to be scaled up significantly in the case of keeping coal within the energy system.</span></p>
<p><span>Irrespective of the economics of CO</span><sub><span>2</span></sub><span> pipelines and deployment of carbon capture, utilisation, and storage (CCUS) technology, Poland will need to adhere to the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive (</span><a href="https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energy-directive-targets-and-rules/renewable-energy-directive_en" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><span>RED III</span></a><span>) and account for ageing coal infrastructure that will need replacement regardless of climate targets.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 3:</strong> Carbon capture sequestration in Poland, export, and utilisation.</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Role of Nuclear Energy</span></h2>
<p><span>In all our model pathways nuclear energy plays a significant role in providing zero carbon electricity for the power sector as well as steam for industrial processes and district heating (see “Achieving Clean Heat”) and hydrogen production (see “Essential Hydrogen Interconnector”). We consider the potential of different sizes and types of reactors, including large light water reactors and advanced small modular reactors. </span></p>
<p><span>In the power sector, nuclear energy provides 19 GW of electric capacity by 2050 in our “Core” pathway. With less nuclear deployment due to cost constraints, represented with our “High Nuclear Costs” pathway, Poland would need to deploy more than three times the capacity of alternative clean energy resources. Figure 4 shows that replacing 19 GW of nuclear energy requires building more than 70 GW of alternative resources including majority solar, offshore wind, gas, and storage. The total electric capacity needs to be higher to provide the same electricity generation, including an increased gas peaker capacity and more electric storage to balance the grid. </span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 4:</strong> Change in electricity capacity for the “High Nuclear Costs” pathways compared to “Core”</span></h4>
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<p><span>Offshore wind power becomes especially important in any pathway with limited nuclear energy deployment as solar and onshore wind power are using almost all available resources (see Figure 6). As you can see in Figure 5, the technologies have an inverse deployment relationship. High nuclear cost increases offshore wind demand and vice versa as shown by the “High Offshore Wind Costs” pathway. Considering cost and subsequent deployment uncertainties, a flexible framework that incentivizes the buildout of both nuclear and offshore wind is necessary.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 5:</strong> Electricity generation across all modelled scenarios.</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Renewable Resource Availability</span></h2>
<p><span>The EU requires Poland to reach 42.5% renewables in final energy consumption by 2030, a target that Poland can reach considering wind and solar resource potential. In our analysis, we consider the potential of renewable resources based on land use availability, resource quality, and relative economics compared to other clean energy resources. Reaching this target for final energy consumption will require Poland to ramp up its current power sector target of 50% renewables by 2030 and the electrification of the transportation sector (see “Electric Vehicles”). Our pathways suggest Poland should achieve 60-66% renewables in the power sector by 2030 even while total electricity generation increases by 50% compared to 2022.</span></p>
<p><span>Below you can see the Wind and Solar Resource Potential for Poland (orange) and how much of the renewable resources are used in each pathway over time (blue) to meet the renewable energy share. Onshore wind is a valuable resource that is maxed out in all pathways by 2040, except in a pathway where we explicitly prevent additional onshore wind builds. The vast majority of fixed offshore wind resources are used up over time as well and most pathways are also tapping into more expensive floating offshore wind resources. If nuclear power is prevented due to high cost or if onshore wind cannot be deployed, both fixed and floating offshore wind resources are facing maximum use. Solar is deployed across all pathways and large-scale deployment is maxed out if nuclear deployment is limited.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 6:</strong> Wind and solar resource potential.</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Essential Hydrogen Interconnector</span></h2>
<p><span>Poland is currently the third largest hydrogen producer (1.3 Mt H</span><span>2</span><span>/year<sup>2</sup></span><span>) and consumer (0.8 Mt H</span><span>2</span><span>/year<sup>3</sup></span><span>) in Europe and fifth largest producer in the world. Building on this workforce and experience, Poland can establish a clean hydrogen industry that fulfils domestic hydrogen demand (a key priority for energy security) and interconnects and exports hydrogen from the Baltics to Germany and other nations in need. </span></p>
<p><span>Figure 7 shows Poland’s domestic hydrogen production. Across all pathways, Poland can leverage its hydrogen experience, future nuclear and offshore power, and biomass resources to become a large-scale hydrogen producer. The “High Biomass” pathway sees the most hydrogen product due to expanded BECCS hydrogen and nuclear heat electrolysis potential.</span></p>
<p><span>Poland’s strategic location makes it an essential hydrogen interconnector for pipelines between the Baltics and Germany and other Central European countries. As shown in Figure 7, Poland can take hydrogen from the Baltics and domestic production, use it as a feedstock to produce e-fuels and ammonia, and export these alternative fuels. Fostering collaboration and strategic partnerships with neighbouring countries will create a cohesive regional hydrogen and alternative fuel network, leveraging an economic opportunity for Poland as a hydrogen interconnector.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 7: </strong>Hydrogen supply and demand</span></h4>
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<h2><span>Electric Vehicles</span></h2>
<p><span>Early and large-scale electrification, especially of the transportation sector, plays a vital role in the transition to a net-zero emissions economy. The difference between a short-term (“Core” pathway) and long-term electrification (“Slow Consumer Uptake” pathway) in transportation is a much higher price tag during a delayed transportation electrification. </span></p>
<p><span>Below are the additional costs or savings by 2030 or 2050 compared to our Reference pathway that does not achieve net-zero emissions. On the one hand, slow electrification in transportation saves money in the near-term as no or little investments are made into electric vehicle infrastructure. On the other hand, slow electrification ends up costing significantly more money in the long-term because the system has little build-out of cost- and energy-efficient EV infrastructure and requires a higher dependency on expensive zero-emissions liquid fuels to achieve net-zero targets.</span></p>
<p><span>The electric vehicle deployment differences between the Core and Slow Consumer Uptake pathway are significant. In the most economic Core pathway, Poland will have 8.5 million passenger and 660,000 freight EVs by 2030. In the Slow Consumer Uptake pathway, only 1.9 million passenger and 220,000 freight EVs will be in Poland by 2030—a third to a quarter of the capacity of the Core pathway.</span></p>
<h4><span><strong>Figure 8: </strong>Transportation system costs across scenarios compared to Reference.</span></h4>
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<h4><span>To explore all of our results from NZP see below the full data Tableau.</span></h4>
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<h3><a href="https://carbonfreeeurope.imgix.net/Polands-Pathways-to-Net-Zero-Emissions.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Click here to view the full PDF. </a></h3>

Poland’s Pathways to Net-Zero Emissions

<p>Even at its best, COP - the UN’s annual climate meeting - yields mixed results. Securing bold agreements from 200 countries is near impossible and translating those commitments into action is an even greater challenge. Yet, the process remains valuable. It focuses international attention on addressing climate change and forces conversations on difficult issues. At its best, COP can give countries direction and inspire renewed commitment to reducing emissions at the national and international level. </p>
<p>I was on the ground in Dubai for COP28 along with Kelsey Paulding, Carbon-Free Europe’s (CFE) EU Director, and Elena Benaim, CFE’s Policy Advisor. In Dubai, our team <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/events/cfes-net-zero-for-nuclear-night-at-cop28" target="_blank" rel="noopener">participated in a series of speaking engagements</a> at COP28 and the Net Zero Nuclear Summit 2023. CFE also hosted a reception celebrating the bold new commitments to <a href="https://www.energy.gov/articles/cop28-countries-launch-declaration-triple-nuclear-energy-capacity-2050-recognizing-key" target="_blank" rel="noopener">triple the global nuclear energy capacity by 2050</a> and joined the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum. It was an eventful and informative trip. </p>
<p>Here are our top takeaways:</p>
<h3>Win for Technology-Inclusivity</h3>
<p>As noted by <a href="https://heatmap.news/technology/cop28-global-stocktake-climate-tech?utm_source=mailchimp&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=em_newsletter" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Heatmap</a>, technology was the “Stealth Hero'' of COP28. The final announcement at COP expressed a commitment to accelerated development of “zero- and low-emissions technologies” including carbon capture, direct air capture, nuclear, and low-carbon hydrogen. The announcement also called for the tripling of <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/environment/20231202-more-than-110-countries-join-cop28-deal-to-triple-renewable-energy-by-2030" target="_blank" rel="noopener">renewables</a> and <a href="https://www.energy.gov/articles/cop28-countries-launch-declaration-triple-nuclear-energy-capacity-2050-recognizing-key" target="_blank" rel="noopener">nuclear energy</a> as well as new participants in the <a href="https://www.carbonmanagementchallenge.org/cmc/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Carbon Management Challenge</a>. Since CFE’s launch at COP26, we’ve gone from having to whisper about nuclear and carbon capture technologies to having both identified as critical tools to meet climate targets - a remarkable shift in just a few years. As CFE’s <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling/Carbon-Free-Europe-Annual-Decarbonization-Perspective-2023.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">research </a>reinforces, the more clean energy alternatives we have to deploy, the better our odds are of displacing fossil fuels in a timeframe that avoids the worst impacts of climate change. This technology-inclusive approach is critical for de-risking the energy transition and its acknowledgement at COP28 is a massive step in the right direction.</p>
<h3>Keeping Up The Methane Moment</h3>
<p>At COP26, the US and EU spearheaded the launch of the <a href="https://www.globalmethanepledge.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Global Methane Pledge</a> to reduce methane by 30% from 2020 levels by 2030 (which could avert 0.2C of warming by 2050). Since then, more than 150 countries have signed the pledge. At COP28, several countries also announced how they will achieve these targets, including pledging <a href="https://www.wri.org/news/statement-cop28-countries-announce-new-efforts-reduce-methane-pollution" target="_blank" rel="noopener">$1 billion in new grant funding</a>. This year, we also saw 50 of the world's major oil companies join the <a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/news/2023/12/Oil-Gas-Decarbonization-Charter-launched-to--accelerate-climate-action" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Oil and Gas Decarbonization Charter</a> and commit to end flaring and cut methane leaks to "near zero" by 2030 and eliminate methane emissions by 2050. To support the methane phaseout, the World Bank created a $250 million trust fund. However, <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-04/chevron-exxon-opt-out-of-funding-cop28-methane-reduction-fund?leadSource=uverify%20wall" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Chevron and Exxon Mobil opted out of contributing</a> to it. We made progress at COP, but considering these companies account for 40% of global oil production, there is still far more that oil and gas companies must do.</p>
<h3>Long Awaited Language on Fossil Fuels</h3>
<p>COP28 <a href="https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era" target="_blank" rel="noopener">closed with an agreement</a> to transition away from fossil fuels. This is a remarkable accomplishment given COP28 President Sultan Al Jaber <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/03/back-into-caves-cop28-president-dismisses-phase-out-of-fossil-fuels" target="_blank" rel="noopener">previous statements</a> that there was no science supporting the need to phase out fossil fuels. Unless countries enact bold policies to reduce emissions at home, this is all just diplomatic talk.</p>
<h3>Falling Short on Adaptation Financing</h3>
<p>Global climate finance has taken off in recent years. As Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez from Brookings <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-successes-and-failures-of-cop28/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stated, </a>“global climate finance has doubled from $653 billion in 2019-2020 to $1­.3 trillion annually in 2021-2022.” In the US alone, 280 clean energy projects amounting to $282 billion in investment were spearheaded in the first year since the Inflation Reduction Act’s passage.</p>
<p>While capital is flowing for clean energy projects, the same is not true for adaptation. <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-successes-and-failures-of-cop28/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Less than 5%</a> of total climate finance is allocated for adaptation. COP28 kicked off with a historic agreement on a loss and damage fund for developing nations to adapt to the impact of climate change. However, wealthy countries only pledged around <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/06/700m-pledged-to-loss-and-damage-fund-cop28-covers-less-than-02-percent-needed" target="_blank" rel="noopener">$700 million</a> - less than 0.2% of what’s necessary. Estimated damages to developing countries because of climate are around <a href="https://www.v-20.org/resources/publications/climate-vulnerable-economies-loss-report" target="_blank" rel="noopener">$400 billion annually</a>.</p>

Debrief from Dubai: Takeaways from COP28 

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<h2>Takeaways</h2>
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<strong>Powering Up the Power Sector:</strong> Italy requires massive investment in and deployment of renewable electricity capacity to move away from fossil fuel dependence. </li>
<li>
<strong>Building Public Support for Decarbonisation:</strong> Italy should involve a range of different actors, agencies, and community representatives in the decision-making process to ensure public acceptance.</li>
<li>
<strong>Bridging the Geographical Divide:</strong> Italy requires investment into domestic and cross-border T&amp;D and electricity storage infrastructure to ensure grid stability and security.</li>
<li>
<strong>Embracing Technology Inclusivity:</strong> Italy must expand its hydrogen supply chain and explore clean energy technology to ease transition for hard-to-electrify sectors. Italy will benefit from a diversified energy system that boosts resilience, security, independence from fossil fuels, and strategic autonomy.</li>
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<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Within the next year, Italy will need to update its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) and long-term energy strategy to reflect the latest EU targets. Not only does Italy need to reach at least 55% emissions reduction by 2030, it also needs to meet specific targets established in the Fit-for-55 package and REPowerEU for deploying clean energy, reducing energy demand, and diversifying energy supplies.</p>
<p>Italy’s last NECP, published in December 2019, set a preliminary goal of a 33% reduction compared to 2005 GHG emissions by 2030.<sup>1</sup> While it is on track to meet this target, Italy will need to reshape its energy systems to keep pace with the more ambitious reductions linked to the EU’s binding targets.</p>
<p>The country’s energy mix still relies heavily on fossil fuels, comprising 83.4% of the energy supply and powering 63.5% of the country’s electricity.<sup>2</sup> Much of that fuel comes from Russia, which only increases the urgency to decarbonise to shake Italy free of its dependency on unreliable partners that yield energy as a geopolitical weapon. There is no one-size-fits-all strategy to achieve these ambitious emissions reduction and energy security targets. Italy, as with other member states, must chart a course to net zero that suits its needs and plays to national strengths.</p>
<p>Despite two strong motivators for decarbonisation—climate mitigation and energy security—Italy still faces significant roadblocks in its path to emissions abatement. The country’s bureaucratic processes and regulations, coupled with the challenges of maintaining popular support for emissions reductions, will challenge the country’s efforts to meet its goals. We have seen this playout over the past decade as renewable energy deployment has slowed significantly compared to years prior. The country also faces a mismatch between the locus of demand (northern Italy) and the locus of production, areas with the greatest potential for renewable generation (southern Italy).</p>
<p>In this memo, we confront these challenges head on and outline the changes needed to allow Italy to meet its emissions abatement goals, in the face of the country’s unique sociopolitical challenges. Our analysis highlights four key areas of improvement to help Italy meet its new, more ambitious climate targets:</p>
<ol>
<li>Powering Up the Power Sector</li>
<li>Building Public Support for Decarbonisation</li>
<li>Bridging the Geographical Divide</li>
<li>Embracing Technology Inclusivity</li>
</ol>
<h2>Methodology</h2>
<p>This memo is part of a broader study from Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) that models 12 potential pathways (5 scenarios and 7 sensitivities) for the EU and UK to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. This report includes an assessment of what it will take for Italy’s energy system to reach carbon-neutrality across three of the 12 potential pathways:</p>
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<strong>Core Pathway:</strong> This path allows countries to use all available clean energy technologies, in line with their national policies, and assumes high levels of energy efficiency and electrification. It is the most feasible, cost-effective path to net zero.</li>
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<strong>Constrained Renewables Pathway:</strong> This pathway considers less available land for solar and onshore power than the Core Pathway because of siting, permitting, supply chain, or social constraints.</li>
<li>
<strong>High Hydrogen Pathway:</strong> This path assumes delayed efforts to electrify end-uses like vehicles and industrial processes as compared to the Core Pathway, increasing the demand for zero-carbon fuels to replace liquid fossil fuels.</li>
</ul>
<p>To learn more about the other pathways and our full 2023 analysis, please <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling" target="_blank" rel="noopener">click here</a>.</p>
<h2>Powering Up the Power Sector</h2>
<p>Our analysis identifies a gap between Italy’s current electricity generation and capacity, and what is needed to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. CFE’s model reveals that the most feasible path to net zero (known in our analysis as the ‘Core Pathway’) will require a fourfold increase in electricity capacity, bringing Italy’s total electricity capacity from 118 gigawatts (GW) today to 234 GW in 2030 and 456 GW in 2050. While overall primary energy consumption will decrease with energy efficiency improvements from 145 Mtoe in 2022<sup>3</sup> to 76 Mtoe by 2050 (Core Pathway), the increase in electricity demand is inevitable as Italy electrifies economic sectors such as industry, residential, and transport.</p>
<div class="entry-image"><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2s9Faw0dT54SJ7NQi9eIva/f48d26e1f1cb6e19b293eaa1a91c63b9/Italy_chart_Figure_1.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="1375" height="1535"></div>
<p>In 2022, fossil fuels made up 50% of Italy’s electricity capacity.<sup>4</sup> To meet its climate goals, the country must reduce that figure to 18% by 2030 and 8% by 2050. This small amount of remaining fossil fuel capacity is maintained for reliability in extreme events. Italy can then deploy carbon capture and carbon sequestration technologies to counterbalance the remaining 8% fossil fuel-based electricity generation, or even run gas turbines with low carbon fuels like ammonia instead of fossil fuels.</p>
<p>These changes strike a delicate balance: Italy must dramatically increase electricity production, while, simultaneously, transforming how it generates electricity. Renewable proliferation is happening in Italy, but it will need to move faster than ever before to meet the country’s needs and climate goals. The country’s renewable energy supply needs to increase from the 59 GW capacity calculated in 2022 to 419 GW by 2050, according to our analysis.</p>
<p>In practice, which increase requires at least 18,300 additional onshore wind turbines, with an average power of 3MV and an additional 3,630 Photovoltaic (PV) farms with an 84 MW capacity. That means the country will need to build almost 4000 PV farms that match the output of the country’s second largest PV farm, the Montalto di Castro PV power station, which covers 166 hectares and has more than 275,000 operational solar modules.<sup>5</sup> It is no exaggeration to say that increasing renewable deployment to this scale will be a massive undertaking. Our analysis shows it will also require significant investment: constructing both solar and onshore wind is estimated to cost at least 282 and 93 billion Euro by 2050. To meet its goals, Italy will need to leverage public sector investment and regulatory signals to crowd in significant private sector investment.</p>
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<h2>Building Public Support for Decarbonisation</h2>
<p>Public support for clean energy technology plays a critical role in deployment, in particular for renewables like solar and on- and offshore wind. Without adequate support from individuals and civil society, projects can slow significantly or halt entirely, posing a major hurdle to the clean energy transition.</p>
<p>Building an additional 305 GW of solar and 55 GW of onshore wind requires large areas of land and roofs, perhaps prompting a “NIMBY” mentality (not in my backyard) that could prove difficult to overcome as the Italian government works to deploy additional energy resources.</p>
<p>Should the Italian government fail to build adequate public support for new projects on land, as indicated in our Constrained Renewables Pathway, Italy will need to rely on additional offshore wind development (20 GW) to replace solar and onshore wind and meet its climate goals. That shift in electricity capacity, from more onshore capacity in the Core Pathway to more offshore capacity in the Constrained Renewables Pathway, will make the energy transition much more expensive, requiring an additional 12 billion Euro investment by 2050.</p>
<p>To avoid this costly and politically untenable situation, the Italian government must involve a range of different actors, agencies, and community representatives in the decision-making process. Italy should work to build consensus that increased clean energy proliferation is good for Italy’s economy, community, and future wellbeing. Ensuring public acceptance and involvement is pivotal to reaching the 2050 targets. The Italian government should also consider more energy dense resources like nuclear energy which, despite their high upfront cost, have smaller land footprints while providing more and firm zero-carbon electricity capacity.</p>
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<img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/4BP4qhpIEYRmGC7FSTJq2f/53b7844364582f549343ce10c7a96606/Italy_chart_Figure_3.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="2750" height="2238"> <span class="entry-image-caption"><br></span>
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<h2>Bridging the Geographical Divide</h2>
<p>Italy has historically been an electricity import country. In 2022, Italy required 47.4 TWh of imports compared to 4.4 TWh of exports.<sup>6</sup> Demand for electricity is highest in Northern Italy with 58% of electricity consumption in 2022.<sup>7</sup> Italy’s North holds the bulk of the country's industrial activity, but solar and onshore wind capacity, which is modelled to provide 96% of the country’s electricity generation under the Core and High Hydrogen pathway, are concentrated in the south-eastern region and in Sicily and Sardegna. This mismatch makes it hard for the north of Italy to obtain the energy it needs and makes it harder to obtain public support in regions where ambitious renewable deployment efforts are instead required.</p>
<p>The practical challenge inherit in this geographical mismatch will require substantial investment in domestic and cross-country transmission and distribution (T&amp;D) infrastructure. Terna announced a 21 billion Euro domestic T&amp;D investment by 2033.<sup>8</sup> In addition, our Core pathway models cross-country transmission investments of 2 billion Euro by 2030, like Terna’s development plan, and 4 billion Euro by 2050 to expand grid capacity to Tunisia, Greece, Austria, France, Slovenia, and Switzerland. In addition, due to the power intermittency and solar dependence (solar share will need to be 79% of electricity composition by 2050 according to our Core Pathway) Italy will have to invest at least 78 billion Euro into cost-effective electricity storage solutions with a capacity of at least 64 GW, dwarfing the current 3 GW of storage capacity.</p>
<h2>Embracing Technology Inclusivity</h2>
<p>Renewable technologies are the key power resource to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and they are essential to meeting net zero targets. Reaching carbon neutrality and ensuring stability in the energy system with a purely renewable approach is significantly harder than an approach that uses a broader diversity of clean energy technologies. Italy is already relying on significant amounts of electricity imports. Dependency on purely intermittent electricity capacity may create bottlenecks at cross-country transmission. Deploying a broad array of energy sources helps ensure the energy system is strong, resilient to change, and secure. A renewables-only approach is more land-intensive and less resilient than an energy sector that deploys a broader range of clean energy technologies including nuclear, clean hydrogen, and geothermal.</p>
<p>Nuclear energy is independent of weather resources. Advanced small modular reactors could be built in Italy’s North, where solar and onshore wind resources are lacking. Nuclear thus reduces transmission and distribution costs, uses less land,<sup>9</sup> provides highly efficient, concentrated, and firm electricity when intermittent power systems do not operate, and high temperature operations can be used for district heating and hydrogen production. Additionally, hard to electrify industrial processes that rely on high temperature heat could use nuclear power stations to meet their energy needs.</p>
<p>Clean hydrogen produced by nuclear-based high temperature electrolysis can provide fuel for hard-to-electrify transportation subsectors such as heavy-duty trucks or industrial work. Our Core Pathway suggests that by 2050 Italy could produce 40-50% more green hydrogen than it requires domestically, making Italy the third largest green hydrogen producer in the EU, enabling export, and providing a stable energy source for critical manufacturing.</p>
<p>Our High Hydrogen pathway, however, indicates that, should the country delay electrification, Italy will be required to produce even more hydrogen than illustrated in the Core Pathway in order to meet its domestic energy needs and provide essential hydrogen export to other European economies that have limited hydrogen production abilities. In this pathway, without nuclear power, Italy would require 38 GW of additional renewable electricity capacity to produce hydrogen for both domestic and trade needs to lower greenhouse gas emissions.</p>
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<p>The current insufficient funding via the National Hydrogen Strategy and the 450 million Euro State Aid by the EU Commission<sup>10</sup> is but barely a jumpstart compared to the costs our pathways predict. According to our Core and High Hydrogen pathways, the government needs to invest significantly higher funds to develop and shift its focus toward hydrogen as a clean energy technology, especially if electrification is delayed (High Hydrogen Pathway).</p>
<p>Incorporating a strong hydrogen supply chain using both renewable and nuclear power is an essential move that would ease the transition to net zero for hard-to-electrify sectors, while boosting the resilience of Italy’s energy system independent of delays. This clean technology inclusive approach can make Italy a clean energy leader that ensures European energy security, independence from Russian fossil fuels, and strengthens Italy’s strategic autonomy and role in Europe’s net zero ambitions.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Italy's decarbonization challenge is attainable. It requires a comprehensive shift in the power sector, led by a transition from fossil fuels to renewables, coupled with robust public support. Bridging geographical disparities will be essential and considering a clean technology-inclusive approach can ease Italy’s journey toward a decarbonised economy. This transformative path aligns with climate goals and provides greater energy security, economic resilience, and reduced dependence on intermittent electricity sources. Italy has an opportunity to lead by example in Europe's clean energy transition and ensure a sustainable and secure energy future.<a href="#_ednref1" name="_edn1"></a></p>

Italy’s Decarbonisation Challenge

<p>With the recent passage of three landmark pieces of legislation—The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2021 (BIL), The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (CHIPS), and the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA)—the United States has joined the chorus of countries utilizing ‘industrial strategy’ to catalyze clean energy deployment and combat climate change. But unlike those before, the US approach stands alone in its precision, emphasizing smart investment rather than sheer volume. BIL, CHIPS, and IRA have been <a href="https://www.thirdway.org/blog/american-industrial-strategy-a-path-forward-for-clean-energy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">strategically designed</a> to mobilize focused and effective private investment in key industries. Already, this targeted approach has spurred over half a trillion dollars of private investment across dozens of industries, from solar manufacturing to hydrogen production. </p>
<p>Beyond combatting climate change, well-designed clean energy industrial strategy can enhance economic and energy security, revitalize domestic manufacturing sectors and workforces, and build global competitiveness in the technologies that will define the 21st century. CHIPS, BIL, and IRA provide a valuable roadmap for European and United Kingdom contexts as they seek to address their own unique market and policy gaps.</p>
<p>This slide deck aims to demystify the complexities and nuances that surround recent US legislation. From tax credits to technical assistance, dozens of funding structures and policy mechanisms have been tapped to strategically target the highest impact and hardest to decarbonize areas of the US economy. Across the research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&amp;D) spectrum, this ‘private sector led, government enabled’ approach is pioneering a new clean energy era of US industrial strategy; and Carbon Free Europe is excited to communicate lessons learned across the Atlantic as the US, EU, and UK continue to design and implement their own clean energy industrial strategies.</p>
<p><iframe class="scribd_iframe_embed" tabindex="0" title="The US Approach to Clean Energy Industrial Strategy" src="https://www.scribd.com/embeds/678500065/content?start_page=1&amp;view_mode=slideshow&amp;access_key=key-uOAu9Cf1QGWxkMnufOY6" width="800" height="500" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" data-auto-height="false" data-aspect-ratio="1.7790927021696252" data-mce-fragment="1"></iframe></p>
<p> </p>

The US Approach to Clean Energy Industrial Strategy

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<h2>Overview of CFE’s Modelling Analysis</h2>
<p>In 2022, Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) released its first energy systems modelling analysis, identifying five pathways for the EU and UK to reach their 2050 net-zero emissions commitments. Starting in 2023, CFE will update our analysis annually to capture the changing energy and policy landscapes.</p>
<p>The <strong>Core</strong> pathway is the least constrained, allowing countries to use all available clean energy technologies and assuming high energy efficiency and electrification levels. This is the most feasible, cost-effective pathway to net-zero. The other scenarios explore how different policy and implementation constraints impact the route to carbon neutrality. To learn more, visit <a class="c-link" href="http://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-stringify-link="http://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling" data-sk="tooltip_parent">www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling</a>.</p>
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<p>Due to recent energy supply constraints and electricity price volatility, there is renewed appetite to reform <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023PC0148&amp;qid=1679410882233" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the current EU electricity market</a> under the Green Deal Industrial Plan. Carbon-Free Europe supports an electricity market restructuring that is equitable to all clean power technologies (both firm and intermittent), allows for reliable, secure, and affordable clean energy, and embeds emerging technologies, such as long duration energy storage, in a cohesive and resilient way.</p>
<h2>Current Renewable Integration Flaws</h2>
<p>In Carbon-Free Europe’s modelling, market prices, both in terms of the average annual price as well as price patterns, change dramatically with the introduction of hundreds of GWs of renewable generation. The chart below shows the significant pattern of solar generation in the middle of the day progressing through 2050.</p>
<p><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/67bDI0j640mgt8T3qZXdZw/9c7dc069f861f7a71a698ffa2d7244cc/CFE_EMD_white_paper_charts.jpg" alt="" width="2750" height="2250"></p>
<p>This is not a stable investment environment for long-term assets without contractual support. While energy market prices maintain their value as a signal for balancing services, they are insufficient to support renewable energy deployment. Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Contracts for Differences (CFDs) encourage long-term contracting vehicles to provide cost stability to consumers and reduce excess generator profits. While these contractual vehicles may have distorting effects on price and other market signals when applied under various scenarios, PPAs and CFDs will become increasingly important in providing revenue stability for renewables.</p>
<h2>The Significance of Load Flexibility &amp; Energy Storage</h2>
<p><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/6eddhPyepPVack5AEGFOry/d69a1a83fcfee518fee63763e18de9eb/CFE_EMD_white_paper_charts2.jpg" alt="" width="2750" height="1896"></p>
<p>Market mechanisms that encourage load flexibility are critical: By 2050, in CFE’s <strong>Core</strong> pathway, we see 445 GWs of electricity load from hydrogen; 175 GWs of energy from flexible electric heat production; and 75 GWs of coincident end-use load flexibility from space conditioning, water heating, and vehicles. Carbon-Free Europe, therefore, supports the Commission’s efforts to enhance the use of end-use metering data, allow for further sub-metering of customer premise electricity loads, lower the minimum energy bid size to encourage the participation of smaller customers, and expand the use of demand response methods, like peak shaving. In the absence of the participation of these loads, which we term ‘latent storage’ (i.e., storage that already exists in the provision of an energy service), by 2050, we would see a need for an additional 130 GWs of energy storage to balance renewables and avoid peak impacts on the transmission and distribution system. Many of these loads can be optimized both temporally as well as spatially (EV charging, electrolysis, etc.), and information provided by Transmission System Operators (TSOs) in terms of current anticipated grid conditions will be important for their efficient deployment. Even with electricity load flexibility, we see the necessity to deploy hundreds of GWs of storage over the next three decades. However, in order to encourage installed durations (i.e., the amount of time storage can discharge continuously) adequate to meet long-term capacity needs, it’s an open question whether market revenues will be enough, as much of the installed capacity will only be discharged for a few hours every year.</p>
<p><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/4gdWgMr1PxgQF6INnw8bDb/ecc6f394ff6c048561a42a5134d1c102/CFE_EMD_white_paper_charts3.jpg" alt="" width="2750" height="1604"></p>
<p>Carbon-Free Europe welcomes the European Commission’s proposal to reform the EU’s electricity market design to align with the EU’s climate commitments, and to protect consumers, CFE therefore, provisionally supports the idea of a low-carbon capacity mechanism, with some caveats. First, much of the existing capacity payment support in Europe is provided to fossil and nuclear resources, with unlimited ability to sustain their energy production for any duration of time. Instead, co-legislators should consider that capacity remuneration will need to be differentiated by resource capabilities to procure an efficient set of flexibility resources. Second, we see an important role for thermal generators as they transition to backing up renewables and are called on only in the event of sustained low renewable outputs. This limited role naturally limits their emissions impacts. Market mechanisms must adequately compensate thermal generators for this continued role as backup generators, even as they run less and less over time and earn limited (and unpredictable) revenue in the electricity markets. If they are not adequately compensated in the electricity markets in the long-term and are not compensated for their capacity provision, this could significantly increase the costs of providing reliable electricity service in a high renewables environment. We see the need for over 500 GW of non-nuclear dispatchable thermal generation running only ~5% of the year in order to provide reliability in an electrified, highly renewable world.</p>
<p><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/1boIEOTVTTxucbvi1kBIKk/fa7455a0279f4bd0ba7eb2d2e6f83824/CFE_EMD_white_paper_charts4.jpg" alt="" width="2750" height="1792"></p>
<h2>Prioritizing Energy Consumer Protection</h2>
<p>Carbon-Free Europe also supports some of the targeted energy consumer protection proposals in the EU including requiring the transparent appointment of last resort suppliers and improving the process for consumers who must be switched to these suppliers, clarifying the conditions and procedures under which an emergency can declare price support intervention, and protecting the EU’s most vulnerable citizens from disconnection—an imperative that becomes even more important as the EU transitions to a highly electrified future with over 50% of end-use energy satisfied by electricity.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>As the EU institutions work to negotiate and finalize the Electricity Market Design reform as part of the Green Deal Industrial Plan, CFE stresses that the final agreement must accelerate the deployment of clean energy technologies in an equitable way. This should include a detailed plan on allowing flexibility via direct access to electricity markets, and reliability via the structural acknowledgement of capacity needs at certain durations.</p>

<h2>About This Study</h2>
<p>Every year, <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modeling" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Carbon-Free Europe</a> partners with <a href="http://www.evolved.energy" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Evolved Energy Research</a> to create an <strong>Annual Decarbonisation Perspective (ADP)</strong> for the EU &amp; UK. This study provides annual insights into Europe's progress towards carbon neutrality by using cutting-edge energy systems models to evaluate the latest changes in energy policy and technology costs. The <strong>Core</strong> pathway (one of five scenarios) is the least constrained due to its inclusion of all available clean energy technologies. This makes it the most feasible, cost-effective pathway to net-zero. The other four scenarios and seven sensitivities explore how different policy and implementation constraints impact the route to carbon neutrality. To learn more about the 2023 scenarios and sensitivities, see the appendix.</p>
<h2>What shaped CFE's 2023 Annual Decarbonisation Perspective?</h2>
<p>Russia's invasion of Ukraine shed light on Europe's energy dependence on Russian<strong> </strong>fossil fuels, resulting in an energy supply and price crisis. With increased pressure to accelerate the energy transition while also ensuring energy sovereignty, EU policymakers have now finalised most files within the Fit for 55 package and the Commission's REPowerEU plan. Meanwhile, in the UK, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has prioritised stabilising the economy and combatting the energy crisis. These events drastically impacted 2022’s energy landscape, with these effects reflected in 2023’s analysis.</p>
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<h2>Takeaways</h2>
<ol>
<li>Recent climate policy, including the Fit for 55 and REPowerEU, has laid the groundwork for the EU’s ability to quit Russian natural gas in the near term.</li>
<li>Ukraine can become a unique contributor of both clean electricity and hydrogen to the rest of Europe, adding almost 100 GWs of new wind and solar by 2050, or almost 20% of today’s EU renewable capacity.</li>
<li>Technology-inclusive policies decrease the EU’s dependence on energy imports.</li>
<li>The EU will need to build new infrastructure–electricity grids, hydrogen pipelines, and CO<sub>2</sub> pipelines–at unprecedented rates to sustain a clean energy economy, requiring faster siting, permitting, and financing of projects.</li>
<li>It is imperative for the EU to facilitate near-term financing and RD&amp;D support for innovative technologies necessary for long-term decarbonisation.</li>
<li>Encouraging flexibility (e.g., through Electricity Market Design reform and updating rate design to account for system-wide costs) is critical to the reliable and affordable operations of a clean power grid.</li>
<li>A technology-inclusive hydrogen strategy is integral to the EU’s decarbonisation plans.</li>
<li>Some countries will max out the usage of their renewable resource potential, underscoring the importance of long-term planning for resource constraints and land availability.</li>
<li>Member State National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) revisions must incorporate data-based assumptions about the activities of surrounding regions.</li>
<li>Our first-of-a-kind analysis, using climate-specific capital costs for direct air capture (DAC) technologies based on hourly operations, finds DAC technology is a competitive option against other negative emissions technologies.</li>
</ol>
</div>
</div>
<h2>Key Takeaways for Policymakers</h2>
<p><strong><span data-preserver-spaces="true">1. Recent climate policy, including the Fit for 55 and REPowerEU, has laid the groundwork for the EU’s ability to quit Russian natural gas in the near term. </span></strong><span data-preserver-spaces="true">Our incorporation of a physical representation of the gas system and new binding EU targets, as part of the 2023 data updates, enabled our modelling to show that the accelerated deployment of renewables, heat pumps, building retrofits, hydrogen, and biomethane, as well as some expansion of other pipeline imports and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG), allows the EU and UK to rapidly reduce Russian natural gas imports to zero by no later than 2025.</span></p>
<p> </p>
<p><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/4W7gxLpTV2fjm2GPtFYjxM/1cee8eb53c6d6e8633cd933258c3907e/ADP_Exec_Summary_figure_1.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="2750" height="1816"><strong>2.</strong> <strong><span data-preserver-spaces="true">Ukraine can become a unique contributor of both clean electricity and hydrogen to the rest of Europe, adding almost 100 GWs of new wind and solar by 2050, or almost 20% of today’s EU renewable capacity.</span></strong><span data-preserver-spaces="true"> Due to Ukraine’s exceptional renewable resource potential, our model indicates that Ukraine can produce over 300 TWh of new renewable generation for the EU. This generation can convert into hydrogen, requiring a new hydrogen pipeline network, or in the form of electricity, requiring rebuilding damaged transmission lines to allow for Ukraine’s full integration into the EU grid.</span></p>
<div class="entry-image entry-image-offset"><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/eop5CG3c67EFpOcdsyZKU/5f383935412d1532b7dfcd95909dd6d1/ADP_Exec_Summary_figure_2_900.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="3750" height="2030"></div>
<p><strong>3. Technology-inclusive policies decrease Europe’s dependence on energy imports. </strong>In all modelled scenarios, most of the EU’s primary energy is produced within its  borders, representing a significant shift from today. However, in the long run, the EU will remain reliant to some extent on energy imports in the form of hydrogen, zero-carbon fuels, and electricity. Scenarios with limited technology strategies (i.e., excluding carbon capture and storage, nuclear, biomass, etc.) result in larger amounts of imported primary energy. Therefore, policymakers will still need to prioritise energy security, including the amount of imported energy required and the location it is being exported from, to avoid becoming heavily dependent on one technology pathway or unreliable partners.</p>
<div class="entry-image entry-image-offset"><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/e1isGQMn9dNAVCujQpRzS/37e16225dfaec1eb5eedcb98ae63f1d8/ADP_Exec_Summary_figure_3_900.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="3750" height="2364"></div>
<p><strong>4. The EU will need to build new infrastructure–electricity grids, hydrogen pipelines, and CO<sub>2</sub> pipelines–at unprecedented rates to sustain a clean energy economy, requiring faster siting, permitting, and financing of projects. </strong>Successfully planning out the integration of networked infrastructure is a key component of a decarbonisation plan, and therefore, the EU must strategically design these interconnections wisely. CFE’s model sees an increase of up to 170% in terms of inter-regional electricity connections, and the development of networks that can deliver up to 100,000 tonnes of H<sub>2</sub> and 450,000 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> daily across country borders.</p>
<div class="entry-image">
<img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2XGloi5N5jIUCxuPxAftnN/4e7f99eb3a059313c77761ebd905536c/ADP_Exec_Summary_figure_4.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="2750" height="2790"><strong>5. It is imperative for the EU to facilitate near-term financing and RD&amp;D support for innovative technologies necessary for long-term decarbonisation. </strong>Fully decarbonising by 2050 is a different challenge than meeting 2030 climate targets. Thanks to recent EU policies, like the Fit for 55 package, our modelling scenarios show broad agreement on the path to 2030. However, our scenarios diverge considerably by mid-century due to their distinct assumptions and limitations. To achieve a net-zero trajectory, policymakers must concentrate on near-term policies and the funding tools necessary to deploy key 2030 technologies like renewables, electric vehicles, and heat pumps, all while supporting technology research, development, and demonstration (RD&amp;D) and policy frameworks that can contribute to “last mile” emissions reductions on a net-zero pathway.</div>
<p><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2mP4UL2AnQejLkU8gVWFNh/bfd0fa77de67f36b801d35b154082efe/ADP_Exec_Summary_figure_5.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="2750" height="1664"><strong>6. Encouraging flexibility (e.g., through Electricity Market Design reforms and updating rate designs to account for system-wide costs) is critical to the reliable and affordable operations of a clean power grid. </strong>This can decrease renewable curtailment by up to 150 TWh; increase the competitiveness of renewables against fossil alternatives; increases the competitiveness of hydrogen electrolysis and decarbonised industrial heat; and reduce the need to invest in other balancing solutions (batteries, thermal powerplants, etc.) and grid infrastructure.</p>
<div class="entry-image">
<div class="entry-image">
<img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/1Znc3UxtmSc2UgMU30MzoR/4f869da4ae95ca426c378ef856d61c34/ADP_Exec_Summary_figure_6.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="2750" height="9261"><strong>7. A technology-inclusive hydrogen strategy is integral to the EU’s decarbonisation plans. </strong>As acknowledged through the EU Hydrogen strategy, hydrogen will play an essential role in deep decarbonisation as the EU electrifies its system and provides clean fuels for hard-to-electrify sectors. Low-temperature electrolysis, high-temperature nuclear electrolysis, and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) hydrogen can all contribute significantly to European hydrogen production. However, cost projections, overall projected demand, and the availability of renewables influence the relative shares of these hydrogen production methods. These three constraints underscore the importance of allowing all clean forms of hydrogen production to exist in a net-zero emissions system, enhancing resiliency.</div>
</div>
<div class="entry-image entry-image-offset"><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/3PQ65aP8wuCaDydZgMbftB/c02b15aaf41836657c6a7e2596379e71/ADP_Exec_Summary_figure_7_900.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="3750" height="2415"></div>
<p><strong>8. Some countries will max out the usage of their renewable resource potential, underscoring the importance of long-term planning for resource constraints and land availability. </strong>This finding reinforces the need for integrated network planning as well as supporting the development of alternative technologies. Despite not being competitive today against the lowest-cost wind and solar, in the long-term, we see the deployment of advanced nuclear, enhanced geothermal, and floating offshore wind technologies as research and deployment reduce technology costs, and these technologies reduce system-wide costs. This insight also offers a cautionary tale to Member States who choose to maintain or implement exclusionary clean energy policies. Not only is a tech-inclusive approach to net-zero more cost-effective, but it offers more energy independence as it mitigates the overreliance on imports.</p>
<div class="entry-image">
<img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/6CILxy4fIYl9hec26LD3bR/4b39fe9924de77aa921e375db4582429/ADP_Exec_Summary_figure_8.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="2750" height="2447"><strong>9. Member State National Energy and Climate Plans (NECP) revisions must incorporate data-based assumptions about the activities of surrounding regions.</strong> Many of the most critical decarbonisation decisions a country makes are informed by the interconnections with its surrounding neighbours. This is true, most commonly for electricity, but also for deploying CO<sub>2</sub> pipelines and geologic sequestration; hydrogen production, pipelines, and storage; negative emissions technologies; and zero-carbon fuel production. Due to the importance of these cross-border interactions, a country’s net-zero trajectory cannot be understood or analysed in isolation. As Member States revise their National Energy and Climate Plans (NECP) and prepare for their final submission to the European Commission by 2024, it would be prudent for their planning to incorporate assumptions about the activities of surrounding regions.</div>
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<strong>10. Our first-of-a-kind analysis, incorporating climate-specific capital costs for Direct Air Capture (DAC) technologies based on hourly operations, finds DAC technology is a competitive option against other negative emissions technologies. </strong>DAC is particularly competitive where there are limited biomass supplies, cost breakthroughs, or increased climate ambition.</div>
<div class="entry-image"><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/5Q2ReD9fk0AoOZAZz1D3jK/3eb98e6090c889d231cccd8ccd2df3af/ADP_Exec_Summary_figure_9.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="2750" height="1490"></div>
<h2>Appendix</h2>
<div class="entry-image">
<img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/2XtaADIdETGRW3mG2u5IMU/a41984d45bdf7eac7362995492d2fbba/CFE_Appendix_Table_Scenarios.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="2750" height="2083"> <em>Sensitivities</em> begin with the <strong>core</strong> scenario and determine the effects on the energy system of changing a single key variable. There are seven separate sensitivities, described in Table 2 below. Many of these relate to the readiness and expected cost of potentially important technologies (<strong>nuclear breakthrough</strong> and <strong>DAC breakthrough</strong>). Others relate to availability of key decarbonisation resources (<strong>limited biomass </strong>and <strong>constrained renewables</strong>) or policy questions (<strong>no flexible load</strong>; <strong>additional policy</strong>; and <strong>net negative</strong>).</div>
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<div class="entry-image"><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/KGUsVPneN3dqL8uUpZ3RA/aa2b9abe36b0d5a80cd2f50703795fde/CFE_Appendix_Table_Sensitivities.jpg" alt="Image Alt Text" width="2750" height="2776"></div>
</div>

2023 ADP: Executive Summary for Policymakers

<h2>A technology-inclusive approach to unlocking hydrogen’s full potential</h2>
<p>Carbon-Free Europe (CFE) welcomes the ongoing work in the Council and European Parliament on the review and revision of the Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas package (<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0073&amp;from=EN" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Directive 2009/73/EC</a>, <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009R0715&amp;from=EN" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Regulation (EC) 715/2009</a>), which aims to enable the market to decarbonise gas consumption. In particular, CFE fully supports the recent developments in the Council, namely the Czech Presidency’s proposal to include in Directive 2009/73/EU the possibility for EU Member States to <strong>use low-carbon hydrogen and low-carbon fuels to complement the calculation of industrial and transport binding targets </strong>under the currently proceeded <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2021/0557/COM_COM(2021)0557_EN.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">revision</a> of the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018L2001&amp;from=EN" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Renewable Energy Directive 2018/2001</a>. </p>
<p>CFE’s research shows that hydrogen has the potential to develop into an entirely new EU industry, <strong>becoming the backbone of the decarbonisation of shipping, industry, freight, and aviation</strong>. Our <a href="https://www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modeling/Summary-for-Policymakers-Analysis-of-Net-Zero-Pathways-for-the-EU-and-UK.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">report</a> <em>“Analysis of net-zero pathways for the EU and UK”</em>, which compares five different decarbonisation pathways for the EU, confirms that the <strong><em>chances of reaching emissions goals for the EU increase as more low-carbon technology and fuel options, such as low-carbon hydrogen, are included in this transition</em></strong>. Moreover, focusing on all low-carbon technologies rather than solely on renewables reduces risk and makes it more likely that clean energy will be cost-effective and net-zero goals can be achieved on schedule.</p>
<p>For instance, our analysis shows that the amount of electricity generation in the EU will more than triple over the next 30 years as electrification of transport, heat, and hydrogen will drive new demands for clean electricity. However, the analysed 100% renewables pathway, which allows only renewable hydrogen, costs over €80 billion a year more by 2050 compared to the Core pathway and requires a quadrupling, rather than a tripling, of electricity generation to satisfy additional renewable hydrogen production. And while our model still sees over half of hydrogen produced by renewables in most scenarios, other clean power sources make up a significant portion of hydrogen production. For example, by 2050, in the Core pathway, our model anticipates 51% of the EU’s hydrogen to be produced by renewables (low-temperature electrolysis), 4% by bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, and 45% by low-carbon technologies capable of producing hydrogen through high-temperature electrolysis (Figure 1). Additionally, CFE’s model optimizes sector coupling and balances hourly variations of renewable generation to make the energy systems more efficient and flexible during hourly and seasonal variability. These features allow carbon-free sources, such as nuclear power, to supply additional electricity to the grid during periods of low renewable generation and supply hydrogen when renewable generation is higher and there is less demand for electricity from other sources.</p>
<div class="entry-image entry-image-offset"><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/4sGHR6JBIV7EhKbpIpvJ2L/96acffff340549ce590bed4be98c6e45/Hydrogen_Chart_Figure_2.png" alt="Image Alt Text" width="1876" height="1022"></div>
<h4><strong>A Competitive Advantage</strong></h4>
<p>Producing hydrogen from renewables and low-carbon sources can provide the EU with an opportunity to remain competitive in a €4 Trillion+ global industry<sup>1</sup>. If the EU does not consider a technology-inclusive approach for hydrogen production, it risks isolating its industry from other nations, like the US and UK, that will have more opportunities to ramp up their supply and export potential. This is of particular relevance and has direct implications for EU Member States that will have difficulties producing large enough volumes of renewable hydrogen due to different geographical resource conditions and land availability.</p>
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<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>Taking into account the results of the CFE modelling and in the context of the ongoing negotiations on the Hydrogen and Decarbonised Gas package, Carbon-Free Europe recommends:</p>
<ul class="boldList">
<li>the Council <strong>consider the role low-carbon hydrogen can play in decarbonising the EU’s economy in line with the bloc’s climate objectives</strong>. This can be achieved by ensuring that the Czech Presidency’s proposal (new Article 8a in Directive 2009/73/EU) is included in the Council’s General Approach.</li>
<li>the European Parliament support this inclusion as it mirrors its <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0317_EN.pdf">position</a> (Recital 22a) on the Renewable Energy Directive (EU) 2018/2001, recognising the importance of low-carbon hydrogen in the energy transition to reduce emissions of existing fuels (complementary provisions on the role of low-carbon fuels and low-carbon hydrogen to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050).</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<h2><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2>
<p>These recommendations will allow the EU to <strong>unlock the full potential of low-carbon hydrogen,</strong> which in consequence, can <strong>help the bloc achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 while also lowering risks and costs</strong>. Furthermore, the accelerated deployment of low-carbon energy sources in tandem with renewables is essential for the European Union to phase out its reliance on Russia and build up its competitiveness in emerging clean energy markets.</p>

Net-Zero Requires Hydrogen from All Low-Carbon Energy Sources

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<h2>Overview of Modelling Analysis</h2>
<p><span class="ContentPasted4" data-ogsb="rgb(255, 255, 255)">As part of Carbon-Free Europe's (CFE) first analysis in 2022, C</span>FE modelled five potential pathways for the EU and UK to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. The <strong><em>Core</em></strong> pathway is the least constrained, allowing countries to use all available clean energy technologies and assuming high levels of energy efficiency and electrification. This is the most feasible, cost-effective pathway to net-zero. The other four pathways are designed to explore how different policy and implementation constraints impact the route to carbon-neutrality. To learn more about the other pathways and our full 2022 analysis, visit <a href="http://www.carbonfreeeurope.org">www.carbonfreeeurope.org/modelling/archive/2022</a>.</p>
</div>
</div>
<h2>Today’s Energy System</h2>
<p>In 2019, 38% of Finland’s energy supply came from fossil fuels (7% from coal, 7% from gas, and 24% from oil). Nuclear energy supplied 18%, and renewable energy sources, including biomass, provided 37%. When looking at Finland’s emissions that same year, 31% came from the energy sector (primarily electricity generation), 35% from industry, 21% from transport, and 9% from residential and commercial buildings. 2019 is a good baseline year to understand Europe’s long-term energy demand and supply since impacts from the pandemic have heavily skewed data from 2020-2021. 2019 is also the most recent year for which Eurostat data is available.</p>
<h2>Key Takeaways: The <em>Core </em>Pathway in 2050</h2>
<ol class="boldList">
<li>
<strong>Finland’s most feasible and cost-effective pathway to net-zero is the Core pathway, which uses every available clean energy technology, including nuclear power and carbon capture.</strong> In this pathway, by 2050, Finland’s estimated electricity mix is 62% wind, 22% nuclear, 10% existing hydro, and less than 1% gas. The Core pathway requires €116 billion of investment through 2050 in key technologies, including electricity generation and storage, clean fuels, direct air capture, and heat pumps.</li>
<li>
<strong>By 2050 in the Core pathway, Finland adds 29 GW of new onshore wind capacity.</strong> This capacity addition is the 7th largest made by any EU + UK country.</li>
<li>
<strong>Finland adds 2 GW of new nuclear electric capacity by 2050, the 10th most added by any EU + UK country.</strong> Finland’s 3 GW of existing nuclear also remain in service through 2050.</li>
<li>
<strong>Finland’s new nuclear capacity is used not only to generate electricity but also to produce hydrogen via high-temperature electrolysis. </strong>Finland produces over 500 kilotonnes of high-temperature electrolytic hydrogen in 2050, the 6th most of any EU + UK country.</li>
<li>
<strong>Finland builds 10 GW of new electric transmission capacity and 2 GW of new hydrogen pipelines by 2050.</strong> New electric transmission capacity ranges as low as 0 GW (when transborder transmission is constrained in the <em>Domestic Preference</em> pathway) and as high as 14 GW (in the <em>100% Renewables</em> pathway).</li>
<li>
<strong>The Netherlands builds 31 GW of new electric transmission capacity, the 5<sup>th</sup> most of any EU + UK country. </strong>However, if transborder transmission is constrained, as seen in the <em>Domestic Preference </em>pathway, new transmission capacity is limited to 5 GW.</li>
<li>
<strong>Finland has a significant biomass supply: 20 million dry tons in 2050, the 9th most of any EU + UK country.</strong> That biomass, primarily from wood and forest residues, is mostly consumed domestically in existing industrial and heat applications through 2050. Finland does not become a large biofuel producer, ranking 26th among EU + UK countries in total biofuel production.</li>
<li>
<strong>Finland will need to increase the rate of renewables deployment over the coming decades to reach net-zero by 2050.</strong> From 2011 to 2020, Finland built an average of 400 MW of renewable energy per year. To meet demand, the country will need to build between 600 to 1500 MW annually through 2050, increasing the historic build rate by a factor of 1.5 to 4x.</li>
</ol>
<h2>Key Energy Metrics</h2>
<p>The table below shows key energy system metrics from the <strong><em>Core </em></strong>pathway, which is the most cost-effective, feasible trajectory to net-zero. The table also shows a range for each metric. That range is generated by comparing the <strong><em>Core </em></strong>pathway to four other modelled pathways designed to evaluate specific constraints.</p>
<p>The <strong><em>Slow Demand Transformation</em></strong> pathway imposes delays in electrification of surface transportation, heating, and industry. The <strong><em>100% Renewables</em></strong> pathway relies strictly on renewables, phases out nuclear power, and prevents carbon capture and sequestration. The <strong><em>Limited Renewable Siting</em></strong> pathway restricts the deployment of wind and solar to reflect land-use and siting constraints. The <strong><em>Domestic Preference</em></strong> pathway prioritises domestic energy supplies and reduces transborder transmission lines and pipelines.</p>
<p>We provide a range for each metric in the table to indicate which model results are highly sensitive to constraints, and which are consistent across all scenarios such that they represent low-regret strategies. We also show Finland’s rank in each metric relative to all EU + UK countries, to identify segments of the decarbonised energy economy where Finland has an opportunity to lead.</p>
<p><img src="//images.ctfassets.net/228txxvb8tt7/4ZHBqKOcwepRCs3T3DU4gg/44c4d61187a7aa5e0371513151d656a9/Finland_Summary_Table.jpg" alt="" width="1275" height="1062"></p>

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